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Note
The Army Corps of Engineers: Comprehensive
Floodwater Retention in the Red River Basin and
the Fargo-Moorhead Flood Diversion Project
Michael L. Walls*
Effective flood management is still a struggle for modern
society. The federal government has always had a foothold on
national water policy, but over the last half-century, states and
substate water institutions have taken an active role in project
decision-making.1 Increasingly, extensive flood protection
projects require cooperation from both federal and state
agencies.2 For flood management issues that cross
jurisdictional boundaries, coordination is key, and
disagreement is sometimes inevitable. The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (the Corps) is the federal entity responsible for
administering large water management projects domestically
in the United States.3 Naturally, the Corps must cross paths
with state and local agencies to implement federal water
projects in accordance with state law and stakeholder
preference. In particular, interstate water projects have the
potential to increase state-state and state-federal conflict. The
projects that are selected are often those that maximize the
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1. See infra Parts II.A–B.
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national interest, despite having state-specific origins. This
creates a careful balancing of equities between local, state, and
federal governments.
This Note will address major flood management issues in
the Red River Basin (RRB) that continue to cause disagreement
between RRB stakeholders. This Note focuses on the RRB
because it provides an excellent case study for comparing
government decision-making in response to frequent flood
events. The RRB contextualizes major flaws in comprehensive
floodplain management noted by scholars, lawyers, scientists,
and those critical of the Corps’ planning process. Disagreement
over the massive Fargo-Moorhead Flood Diversion Project
(Diversion project) underway in the RRB captures much of the
discord currently plaguing the Corps’ interstate flood
management strategies.
The Diversion project is one of the largest projects ever
administered by the Corps, involving many project
stakeholders and government agencies.4 Varying viewpoints on
appropriate watershed management strategies have been
discussed throughout the course of the Diversion project’s
development. Some include comprehensive basin-wide
planning, and others a strict diversion design, although both
strategies are not mutually exclusive.5 The Corps’ planning
procedures have come under fire in the last few decades,
especially in the context of comprehensive flood reduction.6
This Note seeks to address conflicts in the Corps’ planning
procedure. This includes ongoing litigation by small upstream
communities against the Corps in response to the Diversion
project’s current design.7 The communities have proffered their
own interpretation of the Corps’ faulty planning process,
seeking redress not only through litigation, but also by devising
floodwater management strategies of their own.8 The
4. About the Authority, F-M AREA DIVERSION,
http://www.fmdiversion.com/authority.php (last visited Oct. 17, 2014).
5. See Daniel P. Loucks, Managing America’s Rivers: Who’s Doing It?, 1
INT’L. J. RIVER BASINMGMT. 21, 25 (2003).
6. See Opponents of Red River Diversion for Fargo-Moorhead Sue US
Army Corps of Engineers, STAR TRIBUNE (Aug. 20, 2013, 8:12 AM),
http://www.startribune.com/local/220335341.html.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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communities contend that alternative project designs were
overlooked, and that they are now stuck with the collateral
effects of the project’s narrowly scoped design.9 At the heart of
this Note is how multiple jurisdictional involvement can inhibit
comprehensive flood-related solutions. The upstream litigation
underlines many water management issues that are the fallout
of large Corps-backed projects.
Parts I and II of this Note provide a brief history of the
Corps and an overview of the Corps’ planning procedure.
Understanding the Corps’ planning procedure is necessary to
understand its recommendation of a massive diversion design.
Part III introduces recurrent flood management issues in the
RRB. This includes disagreement over the cumulative
environmental impacts of many substate watershed projects,
and the RRB’s local policy of comprehensive planning. Part IV
focuses on the Corps’ method for selecting the Diversion project
design. Part IV also explores ongoing litigation between the
Corps and upstream communities within the Diversion
project’s staging area. Part V discusses some of the
complications with comprehensive water retention planning in
the RRB, including discussions on a ring levee system designed
to buffer the upstream communities from the staging area.
Lastly, Part VI supports the idea of centralizing interstate
river basin administration in order to further comprehensive
floodwater retention.
I. THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS’ EXPANSIVE
JURISDICTION
The Corps has maintained general jurisdiction over U.S.
waterways since 1899.10 Initially, its jurisdiction was limited to
traditional navigable waterways, such as rivers and
tributaries.11 But over the last century, the Corps has
9. Id.
10. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2012).
11. See id. (“The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized
by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United
States is prohibited . . . .”); Permitting Process, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENGINEERS,
ST. PAUL DISTRICT, http://www.mvp.usace.army.mil/Missions/Regulatory
/PermittingProcessProcedures.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2014); see also
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (marking a profederal interpretation of
regulating interstate commerce in the context of navigable waterways).
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experienced significant growth in jurisdiction.12 Major
jurisdictional expansion came when Congress enacted the
Flood Control Act of 1936 to address the nation’s growing
concern over the “improvement of navigable waters or their
tributaries, including watersheds thereof, for flood-control
purposes.”13
Later, Congress would pass the 1965 Water Resources
Planning Act (WRPA) in another effort to coordinate the Corps’
involvement in water resource planning at the regional, or
otherwise “basin-wide,” level.14 The WRPA focused on the idea
of river basin agencies, identifying themselves as “neither
Federal agencies nor State agencies,”15 although assuming
“governmental authority and responsibility.”16 The WRPA
commanded a “centralized approach to water resources
planning”17 by mandating interagency-interstate commissions
(“River Basin Commissions,” or RBCs), which would help
facilitate “comprehensive regional or river basin plans.”18 The
12. See infra notes 13–30 and accompanying text.
13. Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, 49 Stat. 1570 (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 701a (2012)) (establishing that “flood control on
navigable waters or their tributaries is a proper activity of the Federal
Government in cooperation with States, their political subdivisions, and
localities . . . .”). The Flood Control Act of 1936 authorized the Corps to
proceed with a multitude of new flood-related projects. The Act stated that a
project could be selected if “the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in
excess of the estimated costs . . . .” Id.
14. Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-298, 79 Stat.
1073 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-5 (2012)).
15. Gary Warren Hart, Creative Federalism: Recent Trends in Regional
Water Resources Planning and Development, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 29, 31 (1966)
(quoting Henry P. Caulfield, Jr., Executive Director, Water Resources Council,
unpublished speech at Cornell University Conference on State Planning (Mar.
24, 1966)).
16. Id.
17. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM’N ON GEOSCIENCES, ENV’T & RES.,
NEW DIRECTIONS IN WATER RESOURCE PLANNING 15 (1999) [hereinafter NEW
DIRECTIONS].
18. Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1962a-2 (2012).
“Comprehension,” in this Note, is a relative term. It is meant to include all
solutions to water management issues that are state-by-state, interstate, and
internationally recognized (for example, the Red River Basin Commission has
focused much of its energy on Canada and ongoing eutrophication issues in
Lake Winnipeg, Manitoba, caused, in part, by runoff from the RRB). See RED
RIVER BASIN COMM’N, NATURAL RESOURCES FRAMEWORK PLAN (NRFP)
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role of commissions in comprehensive water planning is
summarized below:
[A] commission’s authority bisects layers of government primarily
through its responsibility for coordinating federal, state, interstate,
local and non-governmental plans for water resource development.
Further, the commission is commanded to prepare and maintain a
comprehensive plan which coordinates the planning efforts of a
variety of levels of government and which will act as a blueprint for
development of water resources by this variety of political entities in
the future.19
The WRPA was meant to coordinate the Corps’ planning
process at the basin level20 and to standardize the way
comprehensive project alternatives were evaluated and
implemented.21 Congress responded to the federal-regional
disconnect via RBCs, which in essence would be a local vehicle
for driving comprehensive national water policy, guiding both
the Corps and local government.22 RBCs, although not the
focus of this Note, are referenced as a logical solution to
comprehensive water management despite their somewhat
innocuous existence nationally.23 The main point is that RBCs
attempted to resolve issues that comprehensive flood planning
has been fraught with for decades—how to coordinate
numerous government agencies spanning across multiple
jurisdictions.
In the late 1970s, policy makers eventually determined
that flood losses and environmental damage could be reduced
through coordinated floodplain management and wetland
protection.24 Congress specifically expanded the Corps’
jurisdiction through the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
REPORT 6 (2013), http://www.redriverbasincommission.org/Projects/11-7-13
_NRFP_Report.pdf.
19. Hart, supra note 15, at 35 (citation omitted).
20. See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 15. A basin is “[a]n area
having a common outlet for its surface runoff.” PAUL A. DEBARRY,
WATERSHEDS: PROCESSES, ASSESSMENT, ANDMANAGEMENT 659 (2004).
21. See NEWDIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 15.
22. See Hart, supra note 15, at 31.
23. Some regions of the country have found RBCs advantageous. See
Loucks, supra note 5, at 22. As a federal solution to comprehensive flood
planning, their inclusion in this Note helps establish past federal solutions to
complex interstate river basin systems.
24. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, UNIT 1: FLOODS AND FLOODPLAIN
MANAGEMENT 1-29 (n.d.), https://www.fema.gov/pdf/floodplain/nfip_sg_unit
_1.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
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later amended in 1977 to become the Clean Water Act (CWA).25
Under the CWA,26 the Corps’ jurisdiction expanded drastically,
to also include dredging and fill operations27 involving
“wetlands, ponds, streams and lakes, including those on private
land,”28 as a means to combat wetland conversion into
productive farmland.29 Recent changes affecting the breadth of
CWA coverage will likely call for additional coordination
between the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
Corps, with state agencies and local project stakeholders.30
The Corps’ control over project development was reduced
under the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of
1974.31 The WRDA is an omnibus water bill that authorizes
25. Permitting Process, supra note 11.
26. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
27. Clean Water Act Section 404(c) “Veto Authority,” U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload
/404c.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Veto Authority].
28. Permitting Process, supra note 11.
29. See Maryland Port Admin., Innovative Reuse of Dredged Material,
HARBOR ROCK, http://www.harborrock.com/innovative_reuse.pdf (last visited
Sept. 18, 2014) (noting dredge and fill material can be used to enhance
degraded farmland).
30. EPA and Army Corps of Engineers Clarify Protection for Nation’s
Streams and Wetlands: Agriculture’s Exemptions and Exclusions from Clean
Water Act Expanded by Proposal, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Mar. 25,
2014), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/3881d73f4d4aaa0b85257359
003f5348/ae90dedd9595a02485257ca600557e30 (“The agencies are launching
a robust outreach . . . , holding discussions around the country and gathering
input needed to shape a final rule.”).
31. See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 19; see also Water Resources
Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 2211 (2012)) (“The non-Federal interests for a
navigation project . . . shall pay, during the period of construction of the
project, the following costs . . . .”); NICOLE T. CARTER & CHARLES V. STERN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41243, ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS: WATER
RESOURCE AUTHORIZATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS, AND ACTIVITIES 15 (2014),
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41243.pdf (“Congress fundamentally
transformed the rules for Corps water project planning and funding through
WRDA 1986 (33 U.S.C. § 2211); it established new cost-share formulas,
resulting in greater financial and decision-making roles for local
stakeholders.”). The WRDA of 1986 would establish a cost-sharing strategy for
projects that would “greatly change[] the way new projects would be studied
and evaluated and it established a framework that promoted federal-
nonfederal partnerships.” NEWDIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 19.
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funding for projects undertaken by the Corps,32 but more
generally, omnibus bills bundle unrelated projects together in a
single proposition to Congress, subject to its approval.33 Before
1974, Congress authorized national water projects in the same
bill except under the titles of the Rivers and Harbors Act (to
enhance navigation) and the Flood Control Act (to reduce flood
damage).34
For the Corps, this means that implementation of any
project must “move through a highly structured process that
begins with a congressional study authorization, requires
congressional and presidential approval, and ends . . . with
project implementation . . . .”35 Although congressional
authorization is required, “authorizations are usually
insufficient for a Corps study or construction project to proceed;
action on an authorization requires funding.”36 Put another
way, congressional authorizations make certain projects
eligible to receive federal funding, although project funding is
not guaranteed.37 Project funding is only realized once the
money has been appropriated.38 For those that would benefit
from the Corps’ project, the uncertainty in this process often
breeds frustration and diminishes confidence in federal flood
protection, especially where local project sponsors have secured
their share of project funding.39 As discussed below, this
32. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 19; see also CARTER & STERN,
supra note 31, at summary (“WRDAs historically are omnibus bills including
many provisions for site-specific activities.”). Three general categories of Corps
activities under the WRDA are: (1) project studies, (2) construction projects,
and (3) modifications to existing projects. CARTER & STERN, supra note 31, at
2.
33. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1842 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “omnibus bill”
as “a bill including in one act various separate and distinct matters, and
particularly one joining a number of different subjects in one measure in such
a way as to compel the executive authority to accept provisions which he [or
she] does not approve or else defeat the whole enactment”).
34. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 19.
35. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM’N ON FLOOD CONTROL
ALTERNATIVES IN THE AM. RIVER BASIN, FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE
AMERICAN RIVER BASIN 28 (1995) [hereinafter AMERICAN RIVER BASIN].
36. CARTER& STERN, supra note 31, at 1.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 2.
39. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
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happens to be the current disposition of the Diversion project.40
President Obama authorized funding for the Diversion project
on June 10, 2014, under the Water Resources Reform and
Development Act (WRRDA).41 Now local sponsors must sign a
partnership agreement delineating cost-sharing
responsibilities, as well as the division of labor for constructing
the project.42
II. THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT AND
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION
A. FEDERAL COOPERATION
The 1970s marked a transitional phase for the Corps. The
environmental movement forced the Corps to think critically
about its environmental impact.43 For example, it restructured
its water policies in response to the 1969 National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species
Act of 1973, among other environmental initiatives during that
time.44 These Acts required the Corps to integrate
40. Senators John Hoeven and Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota have
“press[ed]” the Corps to “include funding for the Diversion in the Corps’ work
plan,” and that altogether, “[t]his will bring total funding for the project to $40
million, which will enable the Corps to complete the project engineering and
design phase;” together, both Senators “have included authorization for the
project in the [WRDA].” Funding Ensures Continued Momentum on Diversion
Project, F-M AREA DIVERSION (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.fmdiversion.com
/newsdetails.php?ID=135 (quoting Senator John Hoeven). The “challenge now
is to secure funding for Fiscal Year 2015.” Id.
41. Project Status, F-M AREA DIVERSION, http://www.fmdiversion.com
/status.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
42. Id.
43. CARTER & STERN, supra note 31, at 15; A. Dan Tarlock, A First Look
at a Modern Legal Regime for a “Post-Modern” United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2004) (“[T]he ‘post-modern’ vision of
the Corps is an agency whose primary mission is river and coastal ecosystem
restoration and the management of its existing infrastructure.”); cf. C.
Katopodis & L. P. Aadland, Effective Dam Removal and River Channel
Restoration Approaches, 4 INT’L. J. RIVER BASIN MGMT. 153, 153 (2006) (“As
various societies around the globe, particularly in recent decades, place a
higher priority on river ecosystem health and sustainability, effective
approaches to deal with existing and new dams are emerging.”).
44. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 17 (“Congress passed several
statutes that had considerable influence on the Corps’ (and other federal
agencies’) planning processes, and the presidents during this time issued
2015] FLOOD DIVERSION PROJECT 555
environmental risk analysis prospectively into all Corps
projects.45 Notably, NEPA required the Corps to issue
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) to assess the
environmental risks associated with project alternatives.46
The EIS is critical for project stakeholders and government
agencies to assess project alternatives. For example, some
states affected by a Corps-administered project may disagree
with the project’s environmental costs relative to the monetary
and social benefits it confers nationally. State determination
should be a forerunner of Corps-backed projects. Among a vast
array of considerations, the historical conservation efforts of a
state, state regulatory framework, and environmental policy
goals of a state ought to be weighed in favor of sovereign
determination. Point in case is Minnesota’s “no net loss” policy
regarding wetlands,47 which is a considerably aggressive stance
on wetland preservation.
In addition, NEPA required the Corps to include
“procedural and substantive planning requirements,” which
provided a legal foundation for individuals and communities to
challenge the Corps’ actions.48 NEPA achieved this “through
formal public hearings” and allowing public comment.49 This
several important executive orders relating to natural resources policy and
planning.”).
45. See id. at 17, at 30–31; see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a
Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental
Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 967–69 (2002) (discussing the potential
environmental risks associated with an infrastructure plan administered by
the Corps in the Florida Everglades).
46. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1506.1, 1506.2 (2012).
47. MINN. STAT. § 103A.201 (2014).
The legislature finds that the wetlands of Minnesota provide public
value by conserving surface waters, maintaining and improving water
quality, preserving wildlife habitat, providing recreational
opportunities, reducing runoff, providing for floodwater retention,
reducing stream sedimentation, contributing to improved subsurface
moisture, helping moderate climatic change, and enhancing the
natural beauty of the landscape, and are important to comprehensive
water management, and that it is in the public interest to: (1) achieve
no net loss in the quantity, quality, and biological diversity of
Minnesota’s existing wetlands . . . .
Id.
48. AMERICAN RIVER BASIN, supra note 35, at 29.
49. Id.
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would help the Corps understand local concerns at the project
level. These procedural rights took momentous effect by the
late 1970s, as evidenced by the Corps’ project activities coming
to a standstill due to “differences between the administrative
and legislative branches over water planning”50 as well as
strong environmental proponents “slowing” and even
“reversing” some of the Corps’ water project activities.51 NEPA
would help the public fight against the development of projects
unfavorable to the local environment.
The Corps responded to America’s growing environmental
conscience in two ways. First, moving forward, the Corps would
have to renounce its former paradigm that rivers could be
harnessed through science and engineering alone.52 Certain
flood planning strategies, like strict diversion designs, river
channelization, and tile drainage, would have to be considered
in the wider array of project alternatives.53 Thus, some projects
would be more environmentally suitable than others, albeit at
a higher cost. Second, the Corps could no longer hide from
public perception. People sought to protect the pristine nature
of rivers by lobbying against the construction of projects that
would drastically alter their natural flow.54 The effect of local
politics, imputed to politics in Washington, encouraged open
dialogue about appropriate flood control measures at a regional
scale.55
As time passed, greater awareness of the environmental
impacts of government activity caused agency missions to
overlap.56 The Corps found itself collaborating with other
federal agencies to ensure that the environmental risks of its
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Tarlock, supra note 43, at 1286.
53. Cf. id. at 1287.
54. See, e.g., id. at 1297.
55. One example is the financial-backing provided in the Farm Bill for
rural flood protection projects. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L.
No. 113-76, div. A, tit. II, 128 Stat. 5.
56. See Veto Authority, supra note 27. Under Section 404(c) of the Clean
Water Act, the EPA may limit the Corps’ activity; the EPA may “restrict,
prohibit, deny, or withdraw the use of an area as a disposal site for dredged or
fill material if the discharge will have unacceptable adverse effects on
municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas, wildlife, or
recreational areas.” Id.
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large-scale projects were in compliance with other agencies’
promulgations.57 Presently, some federal partners include the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the EPA.58
Agencies’ responsibilities are often shared with the Corps,
which is more or less a corollary to their overlapping interests.
But when multiple agencies are involved in the same project,
inefficiencies are often a natural consequence.59 Essentially,
what follows is a “too many cooks in the kitchen” result.
Despite sharing many of the same policy goals, a project’s
development may be hindered by each agency’s specific grant of
57. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MEMORANDUM
OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE EPA
CONCERNING FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT FOR THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM OF THE
CLEAN WATER ACT (1989), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals
/2/docs/civilworks/mous/enfmoa.pdf (“The prime goal of the MOA is to
strengthen the Section 404 enforcement program by using the expertise,
resources and initiative of both [the Corps and EPA] in a manner which is
effective and efficient in achieving the goals of the CWA.”).
58. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 69; Stanley Laskowski, Richard
Morgenstern & Allen Blackman, Environmental Decentralization in the United
States: Seeking the Proper Balance Between National and State Authority 5
(Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 05-43, Oct. 2005), available at
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/10779/1/dp050042.pdf.
59. See Philip R. Wandschneider,Managing River Systems: Centralization
vs. Decentralization, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1043, 1065–66 (1984). After
arguing the pros and cons of a centralized river basin management structure,
the author states that “[w]ith the physical complexities of river systems, the
complex character of institutions, and the contradictory arguments for
centralized versus decentralized management, there is simply no clear
judgment either way.”). Id. at 1066. The author uses the Columbia River as a
case study to illustrate the inefficiencies of a decentralized river basin
management approach. Id. Normative economic analysis guides the author to
conclude that “central management” by a public agency with jurisdiction over
an entire river basin would internalize external costs like duplicating efforts,
lack of coordination and accountability between interested parties, and
“amateur management due to small size.” Id. at 1052. However, an argument
for decentralized river basin management is that “negotiation, voluntary
agreement and contract can enable decentralized management to achieve the
efficiencies . . . of central management.” Id. at 1054. The centralization-
decentralization dichotomy is not just an issue at the river basin level, it has
been an issue at the heart of federal/non-federal water resource management.
Id. at 1057. The author uses the example of failing water storage on the
Columbia River, administered by local utilities, to assert that a “fragmented”
approach to river management produced less energy than a unitary approach
under a federal agency. Id. at 1057.
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regulatory power.60 In large part, this is a product of the
federal system of water resource management.61
Professor Jon Cannon describes the fragmentation in U.S.
watershed management as a result of authorities “widely
dispersed, both vertically (among federal, state, and local
levels) and horizontally (within levels).”62 Without effective
coordination, federal and state agencies overseeing a project’s
development can evolve competing interests due to
inconsistencies in water management priorities.63 Coordination
is key where local, state, and federal governments may bear
diverging viewpoints on water policy. The issue becomes even
more problematic when the scope of the project widens to
involve greater stakeholder participation and interstate river
basin systems.64
The Corps must also balance its interpretation of local
environmental law with congressional objectives.65 All Corps
activity is periodically authorized by Congress as individual
projects.66 The Corps’ jurisdiction covers all reaches of the
United States, sometimes in isolated state jurisdictions, and
other times in multiple interstate jurisdictions.67 Every project
is locally specific, however each has varying means of serving
60. See Loucks, supra note 5, at 27 (“Today no law gives any single federal
agency the authority to facilitate any top-down or even bottom-up multi-
agency multi-organization effort towards developing more integrated and
sustainable river basin management programs in America’s major interstate
river basins.”).
61. See Wandschneider, supra note 59, at 1057; cf. Robin Kundis Craig,
Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 79 U. COLO. L.
REV. 825, 826–27 (2008) (delineating all the various federal agencies with a
stake on the water resources of the Colorado River, including: the National
Park Service, EPA, the Corps, the Bureau of Reclamation, Forest Service, and
several Native American tribes).
62. Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25
WM. & MARY ENVT’L L. & POL’Y REV. 379, 387 (2000).
63. See Loucks, supra note 5, at 21–22.
64. See id. at 23.
65. Gerald E. Galloway, Corps of Engineers Responses to the Changing
National Approach to Floodplain Management Since the 1993 Midwest Flood,
130 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 5, 10–11 (2005).
66. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
67. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, REGULATORY JURISDICTION
OVERVIEW 2–3 (n.d.), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs
/civilworks/regulatory/reg_juris_ ov.pdf.
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the national interest.68 Thus, the dual nature of a Corps-backed
project (containing both local and national objectives)
engenders how a project develops. The general rule, however, is
that the Corps is subject to all environmental laws that affect
all other federal agencies and agencies of the state where the
project is implemented.69
When the Corps’ congressional objectives are at odds with
site-specific objectives or other state agency objectives, this can
cause significant disagreement.70 Congress has not attempted
to consolidate all of the Corps’ activity, but instead grants the
Corps its power through different Acts with varying purposes.71
For this reason, there is speculation as to whether the Corps is
being asked to assume too many roles throughout a project’s
development, and at times, is burdened by competing
local/national objectives, without sufficient statutory
guidance.72 A significant issue is that there is no uniform
legislation that encompasses all Corps activity73—instead,
projects are approved on a piecemeal basis.
Defining logical jurisdictional boundaries has put
significant stress on the Corps as well.74 With respect to its
expertise, the Corps has had a longstanding monopoly on
science and engineering.75 In recent years, however, the Corps
68. See Tarlock, supra note 43, at 1317 (“The [Corps] is increasingly asked
to come ‘reason together’ by participating in both large and small scale
watershed governance processes.”) (footnote omitted).
69. Cf. Robert Haskell Abrams, Water Federalism and the Army Corps of
Engineers, 31 UALR L. REV. 395, 415 (2009).
70. See id. at 400.
71. Galloway, supra note 65, at 10–11 (“One Act directs the Corps to carry
out navigation on a given river. Another defines Corps flood damage reduction
responsibilities.”).
72. Tarlock, supra note 43, at 1319.
73. Id. at 1320.
74. Id. at 1287.
75. Id. at 1288 (suggesting that the Corps’ reformation is pulling it in two
opposite directions). First, one school of thought is that the Corps should let go
of its focus on science and engineering and the broad “national interest” model
generally. Id. Rather, the Corps should engage in problem solving that
incorporates “collaborative processes” at the regional level. Id. A critique of
the Corps’ current planning model is that unilateral agency decision does not
build consensus among affected parties. Id. The other school of thought is that
the Corps should adopt rational techniques like “adaptive management.” Id.
Adaptive management emphasizes the feedback loop between learning and
decision making. B.K. WILLIAMS& E.D. BROWN, ADAPTIVEMANAGEMENT: THE
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has adapted its “traditional emphases in hydrology, hydraulics,
and structural engineering by hiring life scientists and
environmental engineers throughout the organization.”76 The
extent of other agency participation will depend on the type of
project, level of expertise within that agency,77 and other
practical considerations.78
B. STATE AND LOCAL COOPERATION
The Corps must also consider the intersection of state and
local government. This arena of water resource management is
a common source of tension between federal and state
regulatory agencies.79 Unlike other areas of environmental
policy, interstate water resource management has primarily
been left to the states.80 The characteristics of water shoulder a
lot of the blame. For instance, water resources (especially
rivers) often establish state boundaries, even though water’s
fluid property does not differentiate between the two.81
Therefore, when states dispute over water, it is often because
each is vying for a mutual resource.82
As noted earlier, RBCs were established in an attempt to
address this very issue. Their justification is readily apparent
where floods occur throughout an interstate river basin
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR APPLICATIONS GUIDE 9 (2012), available
at http://www.usgs.gov/sdc/doc/DOI-Adaptive-Management-Applications-Guid
e-27.pdf. Adaptive management emphasizes decision making at the
stakeholder level but calls for future decision making to be informed by the
observable impact of prior decision making. Id. at 1. Under this view, water
resource management should incorporate “holistic water resource policies.”
Tarlock, supra note 43, at 1288.
76. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 6.
77. See, e.g., id. at 7.
78. Laskowski et al., supra note 58, at 2. Centralizing the Corps’
responsibilities over certain environmental impacts is a practical decision. Id.
Environmental impact research that covers many issues within a broad area
is best administered at the national level, versus individual research at the
state level. Id.
79. See Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate
Water Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 409
(2006).
80. Id. at 409–10.
81. Id. at 410.
82. Id.
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system.83 By coordinating “state and federal roles with regard
to specific federal acts and programs,”84 RBCs tend to
disincentivize lawsuits.85 One critique, however, is that RBCs
have not been consistently integrated into all levels of
government decision making.86 Their overall purpose, however,
stands a good chance to unite state and federal policy
objectives, but other agencies must also be willing to do the
same.87 Today, the disappearance of federal funding for RBCs
has caused their role in comprehensive basin-wide planning to
lessen, and the RBCs’ federal representatives are generally
limited to the heads of the local Corps.88
1. Minnesota and North Dakota Water Law Exemplify the
Complexity of State and Federal Cooperation
The appropriate level of power sharing between the Corps
and states with respect to water resource management elicits
varying opinions.89 Substate watershed planning, such as
83. See NEWDIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 56.
84. D. Craig Bell & Norman K. Johnson, State Water Laws and Federal
Water Uses: The History of Conflict, the Prospects for Accommodation, 21
ENVTL. L. 1, 55 (1991) (suggesting five additional considerations to ameliorate
federal/state conflict: “(1) urging federally regulated entities to comply with
state law, despite a federal agency’s position that such compliance is not
necessary; (2) seeking favorable interpretations of federal law through
litigation; (3) developing and implementing comprehensive procedures to
improve and enhance consultation and coordination between federal and state
agencies; (4) attempting to amend federal laws to require the desired
deference to state water law authority; (5) urging amendments to state law to
improve recognition and protection of all legitimate federal interests in water
resource allocation and management”).
85. Cf. RED RIVER BASIN FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION WORK GRP.,
AGREEMENT 2–3 (1998), available at http://www.rrwmb.org/files
/FDRW/FDRAGMT.pdf [hereinafter MEDIATION AGREEMENT] (“Concern about
the potential cumulative environmental effects of proposed watershed
districts’ flood control projects led the United States Army Corps of Engineers
and Minnesota Department of Natural Resources to initiate a joint
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The EIS was completed, designated
as a Generic EIS for state purposes and subsequently challenged in state
district court by the watershed districts and the Red River Watershed
Management Board.”).
86. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 56.
87. Loucks, supra note 5, at 22.
88. Id. at 26.
89. Chief Justice Rehnquist “advanced a policy position” of “state
sovereignty in water resource allocation” because states are closer to the
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planning undertaken by watershed organizations, has had a
strong presence in regional water resource planning.90 For
example, Minnesota grants its Watershed Districts91 (WDs)
statutory power to enter into agreements that “jointly or
cooperatively exercise any power common to the contracting
parties or any similar powers . . . except for the territorial
limits within which they may be exercised.”92 Similarly, North
Dakota gives its Water Resource Districts (WRDs) the power to
enter into agreements “with any other political
subdivision . . . for the cooperative or joint administration of
any power or function that is authorized by law or assigned to
one or more of them.”93 For either state, including its substate
watershed organizations, water management collaboration is
encouraged to avoid the scalar effects of identical or repetitious
projects.
Sometimes the variations between state-state water
policies can be reduced to fundamental differences. For
instance, collaboration between substate watershed
institutions is sometimes limited by their understanding of a
“watershed,” i.e., definitions of what hydrological boundaries
resource. Abrams, supra note 69, at 405. Contra A. Dan Tarlock, United States
Flood Control Policy: The Incomplete Transition from the Illusion of Total
Protection to Risk Management, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 151, 172 (2012)
(noting that the benefits of having a federal coherent flood strategy that is
binding on the states would help to eliminate disconnecting federal/nonfederal
strategies and alleviate jurisdictional disputes).
90. See, e.g., William Goldfarb, Watershed Management: Slogan or
Solution?, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 483, 496 (1994) (“Substate regional
entities are creatures of state law.”). State management of water resources
made extensive use of watershed districts, commissions, and various
authorities in managing water resources. Id. States have authorized substate
authorities to control, inter alia, conservation, irrigation, drainage, natural
resource management, erosion control, water supply, and flood control. Id.
91. A watershed is defined as “[t]he region or land area that contributes to
the drainage or catchment area above a specific point on a stream or river.”
DEBARRY, supra note 20, at 687.
92. MINN. STAT. § 471.59 subdiv. 1 (Supp. 2013) (emphasis added).
93. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-40.3-01 (2014) (emphasis added); Robert R.
Hearne & Craig C. Kritsky, Characteristics of Active Local Water Management
Districts in the Red River Basin, 12 WATER POL’Y 898, 902 (2010) (the North
Dakota Legislature grants “powerful legislative mandates that allow [its
WRDs] broad powers to regulate water use, develop infrastructure and protect
water resources.”).
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constitute a watershed can differ between states or agencies,94
potentially frustrating some collaborative agreements
altogether.95 Taken to its logical extent, the Corps must be able
to guide its project decisions through even simple bedrock
principles that entrench state water policy, such as how a
project will impact the state’s interpretation of a watershed (or
multiple states’ interpretation for an interstate project).
In addition to substate watershed organizations, state-
level conservation agencies have had to take on
interdisciplinary roles to manage their water resources.96 The
gradual emergence of state agencies caused many states to
reconsider how water management was structurally
organized.97 For example, in Minnesota, water resource-related
statutes and programs were independently created as needs
pressed a particular issue.98 This meant assigning the statutes
and programs to different agencies with somewhat related
responsibilities.99 As a result, failed interagency coordination
has called for a reorganization of Minnesota’s water resource
programs, which has been an ongoing challenge since the
1970s.100 Also consider the state of North Dakota, which
created WRDs in the 1800s to manage and assist in draining
94. The EPA adopts a strategy that is an “ad hoc, esoteric definition of
‘watershed,’” which is essentially determined by socioeconomic factors as well
as physical factors. Goldfarb, supra note 90, at 484–85. Minnesota defines
watershed districts as “special purpose units of local government whose
boundaries follow natural watershed divides.” MINN. ASS’N OF WATERSHED
DISTS., ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2006), available at http://www.mnwatershed.org
/vertical/Sites/%7B8075FBF0-4136-414E-99AC-FC56C14C0AC9%7D/uploads
/%7BDBC159E4-8200-4C90-88E0-EDA5C2395EBA%7D.PDF.
95. See id.
96. John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of
Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 299, 321–22
(2006).
97. Id.
98. Sherry A. Enzler et al., Finding a Path to Sustainable Water
Management: Where We’ve Been, Where We Need to Go, 39 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 842, 896 (2013).
99. Id.
100. See id. at 897, 907–08, 912, 914 (arguing that Minnesota has failed to
recognize connections between hydrologic systems and human and natural
resources, and also has failed to enact overarching water law and policy; a
primary barrier is “fragmentation of water authority between federal, state,
and local units of government and across state agencies”).
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agricultural lands for farm production.101 The districts shifted
their emphasis in the early 1900s to focus on water
conservation via “planning, constructing, and regulating water
supply, drainage, and water management projects”102 to
promote farming. Among other things, water policy in North
Dakota falls largely on infrastructural regulation of water
quantities (hence its place in the United States as an
agricultural powerhouse), whereas Minnesota generally directs
attention toward developing its water quality policies.103
A further example is the difference between jurisdictional
watershed boundaries of North Dakota and Minnesota
watersheds—apart from literal understandings of hydrological
watershed boundaries, discussed above.104 For the most part,
North Dakota’s WRDs work within county lines,105 which
contemplates their ability to manage more than one watershed
in terms of hydrological boundaries. Conceivably, this would
allow WRDs to manage impacts between one watershed and
another (if the county’s borders include more than one
watershed) by the same WRD. Conversely, Minnesota’s
Watershed Districts (WDs) “follow natural hydrological
boundaries,” contemplating jurisdictional boundaries that align
with hydrological boundaries.106 In this way, the WDs’ project
impacts appear to be limited to the hydrological area where its
impacts are most likely to be observed, and consequently
within each WD’s direct control.
Each system has its disadvantages. Watersheds vary in
size and “relatedness,” meaning that small watersheds,
appearing to be a patchwork of hydrological units, can cause
adverse cumulative impacts if managed poorly.107 North
Dakota’s WRDs may limit the effects of relatedness because its
jurisdiction could span multiple hydrological units (e.g.,
101. See Robert R. Hearne, Evolving Water Management Institutions in the
Red River Basin, 40 ENVTL. MGMT. 842, 848 (2007).
102. Id. at 847–48.
103. Id. at 848.
104. See supra note 94 and accompanying text for the assertion that
regulating agencies may have inconsistent interpretations of what constitutes
a watershed.
105. Hearne & Kritsky, supra note 93, at 902.
106. Id.
107. J.B. Ruhl et al., Proposal for a Model State Watershed Management
Act, 33 ENVTL. L. 929, 933 (2003).
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watersheds—assuming there are two or more watersheds
within the particular county), thus potentially reducing
adverse cumulative impacts. However, WRDs may be limited
by their ability to reach all parts of a watershed, given that
their county lines do not align neatly to hydrological watershed
boundaries. This is where joint powers agreements become
critical. WDs appear to be disadvantaged by their inability to
minimize watershed relatedness without successful
coordination with surrounding WDs, perhaps justifying
Minnesota’s statutory grant to “exercise any power common to”
WDs so long as an agreement is reached.108
Each of the considerations discussed above—the historical
trajectory of a state’s water policy, current water policy
initiatives, jurisdictions of substate governments (e.g., county
versus hydrologically defined watersheds), variegated opinions
of what constitutes a watershed, and even common law origins
of water property rights (Minnesota: riparian rights; North
Dakota: prior appropriation)109—begs the question of the
appropriate level of Corps involvement in interstate river basin
systems. One answer by watershed management reformers
suggests that:
[A] federal watershed initiative could express broad national goals
and standards and establish a mechanism for states to submit their
respective watershed management programs for federal approval,
offering in return federal financial support . . . as well as the
commitment that federal agencies will not carry out, fund, or
authorize actions inconsistent with the state plan.110
But a federal overhaul such as this is likely a daunting
task. At any rate, the water law complexities at the subfederal
levels seem almost insurmountable, especially when every
Corps project must be enforceable under state law.111
108. SeeMINN. STAT. § 471.59 subdiv. 1 (Supp. 2013).
109. Hearne, supra note 101, at 846–47. States like North Dakota and
South Dakota have modified the riparian rights doctrine to enjoy the benefits
of transferring water rights and exclusivity, distinguishing themselves as
prior appropriation states. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE
MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 33 (1991).
110. Ruhl et al., supra note 107, at 937.
111. Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition at 4–5, 10–11, North
Dakota Department of Health v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 126
S. Ct. 1568 (2006) (No. 05-628), cert. denied (noting the CWA provides a
general waiver of sovereign immunity, as long as federal agencies comply with
state and local laws).
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III. THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS’ PROJECT
VALUATION
A. COST-SHARING REGIME
Project valuation is perhaps the most hotly contested area
of the Corps’ planning process. For the Corps, project selection
often rests on two conjunctive factors: project impacts and
project alternatives.112 The Corps’ recommendation is guided by
its EIS, which is meant to provide transparency to adverse
environmental impacts.113 In addition, the EIS is a tool for local
project sponsors and participating agencies to make informed
decisions on project alternatives.114 Project alternatives became
sharply focused when the WRDA of 1986 “stipulated actual
cash contributions for most types of projects.”115 This formal
requirement meant that local project sponsors would contribute
to the total cost of projects administered by the Corps.116 This
allowed local project sponsors to make substantial financial
investments in local infrastructure with the assistance of
federal dollars.117 The upshot of local stakeholder participation
in project planning is that interested parties can also hold
substantial bargaining chips during the project selection
phase.118 For example, easy decisions will be made with respect
to structural or nonstructural flood mitigation strategies when
municipal interests are at stake.119 Municipal stakeholders
112. Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U.
COLO. L. REV. 773, 775 (1989).
113. NEPA Documentation, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEPARTMENT
TRANSP., http://environment.fhwa.dot.gov/projdev/docueis.asp (last visited Oct.
24, 2014).
114. Id.
115. See NEWDIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 19.
116. Id. (explaining how the 1986 WRDA forced the hands of
federal/nonfederal partnerships, giving local sponsors a financial interest in
project planning).
117. See id.
118. See Tarlock, supra note 43, at 1320 (arguing that cost sharing has
“devolved” power from the Corps to local districts because it gives “local
sponsors, local representatives, and senators a greater role in project selection,
designs, and most importantly, scope.”).
119. See id. Flood mitigation measures are broken down into structural
measures and nonstructural measures. Dodo J. Thampapillai & Warren F.
Musgrave, Flood Damage Mitigation: A Review of Structural and
2015] FLOOD DIVERSION PROJECT 567
with the right financial backing will be incentivized to divert
flood waters (i.e., structural mitigation) from inhabited
areas,120 even when an alternative, federally recommended
plan is estimated to better preserve the environment.121
B. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Choosing project alternatives bears another level of
complexity. The Corps analyzes project risk through one
overarching document meant to standardize project
assessment, called the Principles and Guidelines (P&Gs).122
The Corps replaced its original project assessment strategy
with the current P&Gs in 1983.123 The primary focus of the
Nonstructural Measures and Alternative Decision Frameworks, 21 WATER
RESOURCES RES. 411, 412 (1985). Structural measures may include dams,
reservoirs, levees, channel improvements, and floodways. Id. However,
“structural measures do not provide complete protection against flooding.
They only reduce the expected value of flood losses and cost of risk taking.” Id.
Nonstructural measures include flood warning and evacuation, and flood plain
land use that “regulat[es] the pattern of development on the floodplain,” flood
proofing, and flood insurance. Id. A primary concern for deciding against
nonstructural mitigation versus structural diversion is a belief that cost
effectiveness is hard to quantify in nonstructural mitigation, and therefore,
the benefits are uncertain to be worth the costs when compared to other
project alternatives, such as structural mitigation. ASS’N OF STATE
FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, NATIONAL FLOOD PROGRAMS AND POLICY IN REVIEW
44 (2007), available at http://www.floods.org/PDF/ASFPM_NFPPR_2007.pdf.
See also Tarlock, supra note 43, at 1296 (advocating the position of Gilbert
White, that “sole reliance on structural flood control measures” versus non-
structural alternatives creates a “moral hazard problem,” which occurs when
increased protection increases the attraction for development of the
floodplain).
120. Cf. Joseph W. Westphal, The Politics of Infrastructure, 75 SOC. RES.
793, 800 (2008).
121. Cf. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ER1105-2-100, PLANNING GUIDANCE
NOTEBOOK (2000).
122. U.S. WATER RES. COUNCIL, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES
IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES (1983) [hereinafter P&Gs]. Other federal agencies
governed by this document include the Bureau of Reclamation, the Tennessee
Valley Authority, and Soil Conservation Service. Id. at 1.
123. EVANS SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF WASH., PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING FEDERAL WATER PROJECTS: U.S. ARMY CORPS
OF ENGINEERS PLANNING AND THE USE OF BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS 7 (2009).
The P&Gs replaced the ESTABLISHMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS FOR
PLANNING WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES, WATER RESOURCES
COUNCIL (1972), which relied on both national economic development and
environmental quality (EQ). EVANS SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, supra, at 11. See
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P&Gs, as opposed to the original document, is designing
projects that maximize the National Economic Development
(NED).124 The P&Gs defines NED as “increases in the net value
of the national output of goods and services, expressed in
monetary units. Contributions to NED are the direct net
benefits that accrue in the planning area and the rest of the
Nation.”125 The traditional role of the P&Gs has been one of
“recommended guidance”126 and strict adherence to the P&Gs
has come with great scrutiny.127
Perhaps the most troublesome issue with the P&Gs is its
formulaic cost-benefit analysis, which is criticized for having
the potential to overlook less quantifiable environmental
outputs.128 Cost-benefit analysis was once an objective
determination of project alternatives for the Corps, but it was
not long before cost-benefit analysis would yield disagreement
between project designs with less quantifiable environmental
outputs and projects more certain to enhance flood
protection.129 The Corps is well aware of public disagreement
generally S. Res. 342, 87th Cong. 6 (1962), available at
http://planning.usace.army.mil/toolbox/library/Guidance/PoliciesStandardsPro
ceduresWResources1962wSupp1_1964.pdf (agreeing to a cost-benefit standard
for project valuation).
124. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 34. Although the Corps identifies
one plan that optimizes NED among other alternatives, it is not necessarily a
predetermined plan. For instance, if the Corps’ collaborating partners,
including local sponsors and stakeholders, are able to raise additional funds
for a plan that exceeds the Corps-selected NED plan, that project alternative
may be recommended. Id. at 38.
125. P&Gs, supra note 122, at iv.
126. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 34.
127. See, e.g., Westphal, supra note 120, at 800.
128. EVANS SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, supra note 123, at 11 (“Benefits and
costs are often difficult to identify, difficult to measure or monetize, and highly
uncertain. Additionally, although the [cost-benefit analysis] process aims for
objectivity, analysts must make many subjective decisions and assumptions.
These might include . . . whether and how to value environmental amenities
(which are not traded in a marketplace), and what categories of benefits and
costs to use.”).
129. See James P. Heaney, New Directions in Water Resources Planning
and Management, 93 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 1, 5 (2011). Some of
the earliest applications of water resource economics began with the
enactment of the Flood Control Act of 1936, which prioritized projects based
on their cost-benefit. Id. The first promulgation of “consistent” sets of
engineering-economic principles for water resource management was in the
1950s. Id. The author notes that the major challenge with this approach is
2015] FLOOD DIVERSION PROJECT 569
over its standards for project valuation.130 The current P&Gs is
under revision, and it is unclear what the future of the Corps’
project assessment will look like until its release.131
IV. THE FARGO-MOORHEAD FLOOD DIVERSION
PROJECT HAS TESTED THE CORPS’ PLANNING
FRAMEWORK
A. HISTORY OF THE RED RIVER BASIN AND FLOOD
MANAGEMENT IN FARGO-MOORHEAD
The nearly predictable flooding of the Red River of the
North (Red River) has been a source of water management
controversy for RRB citizens.132 The Red River divides two
major metropolitan areas along the Minnesota-North Dakota
border.133 The two areas are the Fargo, North Dakota
metropolitan area and Moorhead, Minnesota.134 Over the last
century these communities have fought relentless flood
events.135 The impetus for developing permanent flood
mitigation has grown over the last decade.136 The Red River
has exceeded flood stages every year from 1993 to 2011.137 The
developing “reasonable estimates of future benefits and costs . . . .” Id. The
example the author uses is representative of modern valuation issues, namely,
how to measure cost-benefits “of a stormwater pond which provides flood
control, water quality control, and fish and wildlife enhancement . . . .” Id.
130. See NEWDIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 20, 28.
131. See Updated Principles and Guidelines for Water and Land Related
Resources Implementation Studies, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/PandG (last
visited Oct. 10, 2014) (“Developed by Federal agencies and incorporating
extensive public comment, the modernized P&G will help accelerate project
approvals, reduce costs, and support water infrastructure projects with the
greatest economic and community benefits . . . . Once the Guidelines are
finalized, each agency will update its procedures as needed to apply the new
P&G to their agency-specific missions.”).
132. JAY A. LEITCH & GENE KRENZ, A RIVER RUNS NORTH 1 (2d ed. 2013)
(“It has been said that the [RRB] always has a water supply
problem . . . either too much or not enough!”).
133. See id. (referencing a map of the RRB).
134. Id.
135. Id. (noting the position of Fargo and Moorhead displayed on the map).
136. See id. (“[R]ecords indicate that major flooding prevailed
generally . . . in . . . 2001, 2006, 2009, 2010, and 2011.”).
137. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ST. PAUL DIST., FINAL FARGO-
MOORHEAD FEASIBILITY REPORT AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
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flood of 1997 was historically devastating.138 Flooding that year
alone cost the United States and Canada nearly $5 billion in
flood recovery and mitigation costs.139 A flood of even greater
magnitude occurred less than ten years later in 2009, followed
by comparably sized floods in 2010 and 2011.140
Flooding in the RRB dates back to the days of settlers.141
Accessibility of water was essential to those crossing the Great
Plains.142 Settling near rivers and streams was a natural choice
for pioneers, especially those in the RRB who relied on the Red
River for trading and homesteading.143 In the late 1800s the
RRB’s population increased dramatically.144 Settler-farmers
took an early initiative to convert prairie and wetlands into
premier farmland, which transformed large portions of the
RRB’s landscape.145 Over the years, artificial drainage systems
were constructed to reduce flood loss to communities and
agricultural land.146 In particular, the use of structural control
measures such as straight-line drains replaced the natural
ES-4 (2011) [hereinafter FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT], available at
http://www.fmdiversion.com/pdf/CorpsReports1/Main_Report_with_Attachme
nts.pdf.
138. See INT’L JOINT COMM’N, LIVING WITH THE RED 1 (2000), available at
http://ijc.org/files/tinymce/uploaded/documents/redRiverBoard_microSite/en/Li
ving%20with%20the%20Red%20report%20with%20appendices.pdf.
139. Id.
140. RED RIVER BASIN COMM’N, LONG TERM FLOOD SOLUTIONS 20–21
(2011) [hereinafter LONG TERM FLOOD SOLUTIONS], available at
http://www.redriverbasincommission.org/Comprehensive_Report_12-15-11_FI
NAL.pdf.
141. See LEITCH&KRENZ, supra note 132, at 1.
142. See ANDERSON& LEAL, supra note 109, at 32.
143. Id.; Red River Valley History, RIVER KEEPERS (May 2005),
http://www.riverkeepers.org/files/history_of_red_river_valley.pdf.
144. See Red River Valley History, supra note 143, at 2 (noting that the
population of the Red River Valley grew six fold).
145. See RED RIVER BASIN FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION WORK GRP., A
USER’S GUIDE TO NATURAL RESOURCE EFFORTS IN THE RED RIVER BASIN 7
(2001), available at http://files.dnr.state.mn.us/aboutdnr/reports/redriver
_nrefforts_pdf4.pdf (“[W]aves of immigrants moved into the Basin, plowed up
the prairie, connected and straightened segments of streams, and drained the
standing water and saturated soils.”).
146. See DIMPLE ROY ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
ECOSYSTEM APPROACHES IN INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
(IWRM) 30 (2011), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/iwrm
_transboundary_river_basins.pdf (listing the various measures that have been
employed to mitigate future flooding effects).
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meander of rivers, accelerating runoff from fields.147 The
installation of wetland drainage systems also greatly reduced
the number of native wetlands in the Basin.148 Wetland loss
tends to “aggravate the damage caused by floods.”149
In addition, the Red River is one of eight rivers in the
world that flows north, a fact that is sometimes overlooked.150
This feature is also its kiss of death:
The Red River’s direction of flow from south to north is another
contributing factor to the challenge of retaining water in the basin’s
river channels during its already problematic spring floods. When
the earlier waters from the south encounter a still-frozen river
channel to the north, flow of the river’s waters is impeded [by what
are known as “ice jams.”] Water levels can rise quickly and
dramatically at these points, causing break-outs with resultant
damage to infrastructure and environment.151
As early as 1909, the United States and Canada realized
that flooding would continue to be a pall over both countries.152
Together, the United States and Canada have built major flood
control structures to alleviate annual flood damage.153 The
imminent risk of flood damage has caused many RRB
stakeholders to become actively involved in the flood crisis.154
147. Id. (noting dramatic ecological change as a result of changed drainage
patterns).
148. INT’L JOINT COMM’N, supra note 138, at 25.
149. Id. (“Depending on their structure and condition at the time of the
flood event, wetlands may retain floodwaters and reduce . . . total flood
volumes . . . .”).
150. Slobodan P. Simonovic & Richard W. Carson, Flooding in the Red
River Basin – Lessons from Post Flood Activities, 28 NAT. HAZARDS 345, 346
(2003).
151. LONG TERM FLOOD SOLUTIONS, supra note 140, at 16; Donald P.
Schwert, Why Is the Red River of the North So Vulnerable to Flooding?,
N.D.S.U., http://www.ndsu.edu/fargo_geology/whyflood.htm (last visited Oct.
24, 2014) (“Ice concentrations . . . can only build, retarding or damming water
flow.”).
152. See INT’L JOINT COMM’N, supra note 138, at 7 (discussing a
government action made pursuant to the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty).
153. See ROY ET AL., supra note 146, at 30. Some of these structures
include the Red River Floodway around Winnipeg, Manitoba, and the English
Coulee Diversion of the Grand Forks/East Grand Forks cities which protect
Minnesota and North Dakota citizens along the Red River. Id. Early flood
control coordination between the United States and Canada was memorialized
in the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. Id. at 32.
154. See Jonathan P. Scoll, Flood Control on the Red River as a Complex
Environmental Decision System, 26 NAT. RESOURCES&ENV’T 24, 28 (2012).
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Flood control on the Red River is an exceptional case study
because it represents “competing interests and policies that
drive flood control efforts” in interstate river basin systems.155
The complexity of interagency participation in the RRB creates
a vexing situation.156 Many local, state, federal, and
international government agencies must coordinate their flood
control efforts.157 The most notable are the eight WDs in
Minnesota, four WRDs in North Dakota, the Corps as the
primary federal government entity, various state agencies of
Minnesota and North Dakota, small representative
commissions, and various boards created through joint powers
agreements—and don’t forget Canada.158 The RRB is truly a
watershed management laboratory, with many lessons to be
taken away.159
B. EARLYOVERLAPPING INTERESTS REQUIRE LEGISLATIVE
RESOLUTION
Disagreement over local implementation of flood control
efforts reached its tipping point in the late 1990s. Minnesota
WDs160 and other local governments felt that their role in
155. Id.
156. See id. (“Climate change in the region has increased precipitation,
with the result that while 48 of the last 109 years have seen the Red exceed
its . . . flood stage, such flood stage has been exceeded in every year from 1993
through 2011.”).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Hearne & Kritsky, supra note 93, at 899 (arguing that the
autonomy of Minnesota and North Dakota’s local water management districts,
as opposed to a uniform organizational institution, is what allows each state to
manage its water resources effectively). The authors contend that “[n]o single
organizational arrangement should be accepted as the best arrangement
across a variety of needs and circumstances. Indeed the variety of institutional
arrangements allows new ideas to be developed and more cross agency
learning.” Id.
160. The Minnesota legislature authorized the formation of WDs in the
1955 Watershed District Act. MINN. STAT. § 103D.201 (2014). The purpose of
WDs are “[t]o conserve the natural resources of the state by land use planning,
flood control, and other conservation projects by using sound scientific
principles for the protection of the public health and welfare and the provident
use of the natural resources . . . .” Id. “Since water flows from place to place, a
water resource problem in one community may be caused by another
community’s actions. By managing water resources on a watershed basis,
communities can jointly plan to prevent problems, and coordinate and equably
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planning regional water projects was sometimes challenged by
other agencies.161 Issues arose when the Corps and the
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (MN DNR) began
to worry about the “cumulative environmental effects” of
several small watershed projects.162 In response, the Corps and
the MN DNR initiated an EIS which halted local watershed
actions until the EIS was completed.163 Without state or federal
permitting,164 regional watershed activities were put on hold.165
Eight WDs challenged the Corps and MN DNR on its EIS
directive in state district court.166 In 1997, the Minnesota
legislature responded to the stalemate by authorizing funding
“for a ‘Mediation’ process to attempt resolution of the disputed
issues that were addressed in the EIS, led to the court
challenge, and resulted in gridlock on permitting issues.”167
The mediation agreement was touted as a “framework for a
new, collaborative approach to implementing both flood
damage reduction and natural resource protection and
enhancement in the [RRB] in ways that will benefit all
Minnesota’s citizens.”168 There are still discussions to this day
on how to appropriately implement the mediation
agreement.169
pay for projects to correct problems when they do occur.”MINN. BD. OFWATER
& SOIL RES., WHAT IS A WATERSHED DISTRICT 1 (2005), available at
http://www.bwsr.state.mn.us/planning/whatiswd.pdf.
161. Enzler et al., supra note 98, at 898–99 (explaining how a 1986 House
Research evaluation “recapped the previous fifteen years of water
management studies and suggested that the multiplicity of agencies at all
scales of governance involved in water management create an advocacy
system of strong, competing agencies, each concerned with its own duties and
specific goals.”).
162. MEDIATIONAGREEMENT, supra note 85, at 2.
163. See id.
164. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012) (explaining the Corps’
authority over projects permitting for the discharge of dredged or fill material;
“The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public
hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters
at specified disposal sites.”).
165. See Scoll, supra note 154, at 25.
166. MEDIATIONAGREEMENT, supra note 85, at 3.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1.
169. See Scoll, supra note 154, at 25.
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C. THE CORPS’ RESPONSE TO THE RED RIVER BASIN CRISIS
The RRB has tested the Corps’ flood control strategies and
continues to plague the Corps’ flood control policy.170 The
Diversion project is a good case study on how the Corps
develops federal flood-related projects. More interesting,
however, is how the Diversion project embodies many of the
floodplain management issues associated with multi-
jurisdictional projects.171
The Corps began discussing a diversion project design in
2008.172 Prior to 2008, the Corps administered multiple studies
and projects to counter incessant flood events in the Fargo-
Moorhead metropolitan area.173 At the outset, the Corps
initiated the “Red River Reconnaissance Study” of 2002,
followed by another reconnaissance study which “specifically”
emphasized flood protection options for Fargo-Moorhead.174 To
the satisfaction of Fargo and Moorhead, the cities entered into
a cost-share agreement with the Corps in September 2008, to
continue studying flood relief strategies for the metro area.175
But only later would the selection of a diversion design evolve
into the massive undertaking it has become.176
The Diversion project was one plan among many
alternatives.177 The possible alternatives were: (1) inaction by
continuing emergency measures, (2) non-structural measures,
(3) creation of flood barriers, (4) increased conveyance which
170. See FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at ES-1 (“The purpose
of the feasibility study was to investigate flood issues in the Fargo-Moorhead
Metropolitan Area . . . and, if appropriate . . . recommend implementation of a
federal project.”).
171. History, F-M AREA DIVERSION, http://www.fmdiversion.com
/history.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2014) (“Interagency and public stakeholders
and potentially affected landowners were identified.”).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Dave Kolpack, Flood-Weary Fargo, ND, Lobbies for Permanent Fix,
MPR NEWS (Apr. 28, 2013), http://www.mprnews.org/story/2013/04/27
/regional/red-river-diversion-project-still-under-debate (“But the plan, which
has been kicked around for a few years, has drawn strong opposition from
upstream farmers, homeowners and businesses, who don’t want the diversion
channel carving through their communities. They say it’s [sic] nearly $2
billion price tag is a waste of money . . . .”).
177. FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at ES-4.
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would include diversion channels, or (5) flood storage.178 The
Corps settled on a design that would impart a flood diversion
design,179 and later on, an additional flood retention area to
store floodwaters on rural lands just upstream from the Fargo-
Moorhead metropolitan area where many small communities
rest.180
D. RED RIVER BASIN FLOOD PROTECTION AUTHORITIESUSE
DIFFERENT FLOOD CONTROL STRATEGIES
The lurking risk of catastrophic flooding in the RRB has
spurred the creation of many flood-related organizations.181
The Flood Diversion Board of Authority (Diversion Authority)
was created to “build and operate a flood diversion channel
along the Red River . . . to reduce the flood risk of stakeholder
communities and counties.”182 The Diversion Authority is an
innovative conglomeration of government entities whose
178. Id.
179. Id. The Final Feasibility Report was one of many studies issued by the
Corps that incrementally moved toward a diversion channel design. See Scoll,
supra note 154, at 26. In May 2010, the Corps issued its “Draft Feasibility
Report and Environmental Impact Statement” which featured “several
diversion channel alternatives” that were adjusted according to “cost
estimates for each [diversion] alternative.” U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ST.
PAUL DIST., DRAFT FEASIBILITY REPORT AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT ES-4 (2010) [hereinafter DRAFT FEASIBILITY REPORT]. In
September 2010, hydraulic modeling indicated that the current plan would
have more “extensive downstream impacts” than originally anticipated. Id. In
response, the Corps issued its “Supplemental Draft Feasibility Report and
Environmental Impact Statement,” which reduced the capacity of the channel
diversion by adding an upstream storage and staging area to reduce
downstream impacts. FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at ES-4.
After the end of the public comment period on the proposed changes, including
state agency and other government input, the Corps settled on a plan that was
“virtually identical to that of the 2010 [Draft Feasibility Report]: little more
than a ranking of different locations for the diversion channel, each essentially
an iteration of the same design idea.” Scoll, supra note 154, at 27. The new
design with an upstream retention area would “minimize[] downstream
impacts, cause[] upstream impacts, and provide[] the same level of risk
reduction to the Fargo-Moorhead Metropolitan area as the original.” FINAL
FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at ES-7.
180. See generally FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137 (describing
the Corps’ plan).
181. Scoll, supra note 154, at 25.
182. About the Authority, supra note 4.
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primary goal is coordination and project implementation.183 Its
members include the cities of Fargo and Moorhead, two North
Dakota counties, one Minnesota WD, and a North Dakota joint
WRD.184 The Diversion Authority, Fargo, and Moorhead hold
themselves out as the three nonfederal project sponsors,
although technically Fargo and Moorhead are the Diversion
project’s only nonfederal project sponsors.185 The Diversion
Authority and the Corps have worked closely to develop the
Diversion project.186
Aside from the Diversion Authority, whose work involves
mostly structural flood control measures (i.e., a diversion
channel), the analysis would be remiss to exclude the Red River
Retention Authority (RRRA). The RRRA was specially created
to “ensure joint, comprehensive, and strategic coordination of
retention projects in the Red River of the North watershed” and
to “aggressively pursue federal dollars to off-set local costs for
retention projects.”187 Rural support for “distributed retention”
across the basin has been viewed as an additional solution to
reducing downstream flooding (a priority for the Diversion
Authority as well).188 Flood water retention is a pillar of the
RRRA.189 Flood retention uses “[d]epressional areas within the
landscape [to] capture runoff and allow time for evaporation
and infiltration to occur, which normally results in natural
seasonal drawdown” and has the added benefit of reducing
183. See id.
184. Id.
185. LIMITED JOINT POWERS AGREEMENT METRO, FLOOD DIVERSION
PROJECT 10 (2011), available at http://www.fmdiversion.com/pdf/08
%2012%202011%20-%20Limited%20Joint%20Powers%20Agreement.pdf.
186. See History, supra note 171.
187. RED RIVER RETENTION AUTHORITY, http://www.redriverretention
authority.net/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). The RRRA likens itself as an
“advocate” for aiding smaller local sponsors through the federal regulatory
process. Id.
188. Scoll, supra note 154, at 28.
189. RED RIVER RETENTION AUTHORITY, supra note 187 and accompanying
text.
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peak flood stages.190 Former wetlands are the most ideal
retention areas.191
The difference in planning strategies between the
Corps/Diversion Authority and the RRRA can be summarized
as follows:
[T]he political tension between the constituencies for larger, urban,
Corps-backed projects, on the one hand, and for smaller, more rural,
distributed retention, or other prevention projects, on the
other . . . [is] supported by two very different federal agencies . . . .
The Corps’ flood control mission is carried out through large
construction projects. Its command structure is hierarchical,
centered in Washington. The [United States Department of
Agriculture], whose subsidy programs fund many water district
activities, is rural and agricultural in focus. Its decision making is
largely local.192
As noted, varying financial support will affect which
project alternatives the Corps implements.193 For the Diversion
project, federal and nonfederal funds would be used to create a
flood retention and flood staging area just upstream from the
diversion.194 But in this instance, the Diversion project’s
retention area is not quite on par with the distributed retention
contemplated by the RRRA; the retention area is but one large
isolated area of floodwater storage, designed primarily to hold
back floodwater just before it reaches Fargo-Moorhead.195 On
the other hand, supporters of “basin-wide retention” want to
prevent the destruction of the “last natural flood plain
190. Charles Anderson & Al Kean, Red River Basin Flood Damage
Reduction Framework 25 (Red River Basin Flood Damage Reduction Work
Group Technical and Scientific Advisory Comm., Technical Paper No. 11, May
2004), available at http://www.rrwmb.org/files/FDRW/TP11.pdf.
191. Id. (describing the mechanisms by which wetlands collect and
dissipate excess water).
192. Scoll, supra note 154, at 27.
193. FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at 34 (indicating that the
Corps considers cost and implementability, among other things, when deciding
which course of action is best).
194. Id. at ES-12.
195. See What Is The Difference Between Retention, Staging and Storage?,
FMDAM.ORG (Mar. 22, 2014), http://fmdam.org/what-is-the-difference-
between-retention-staging-and-storage/ (describing how staging works).
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[upstream from] the city” by lauding for distributed retention
throughout the basin to help equalize the effects of flooding.196
Beyond the Corps’ federal financial contribution to the
upstream retention area (more accurately to the project’s
overall cost),197 other retention projects elsewhere in the RRB
stand alone, and do not receive funding from the Corps or the
Diversion project’s nonfederal sponsors.198 Therefore, funding
those projects must come from other federal and local sources—
although still requiring the Corps’ approval depending on the
nature of the project.199
Taken together, the Corps’ stance on RRB flood protection
bears remnants of its old ways. The Corps’ Diversion project,
although necessary in utility, shows signs of weakness in
comprehensive flood protection. Make no mistake, the
Diversion project is integral to the protection of Fargo-
Moorhead citizens.200 In terms of costs to benefits, a diversion
solution made the most economical sense.201 But has the
opportunity to do more passed? Or would remediating the
existing plan to include complimentary means of flood
reduction challenge the Corps’ ability to rationalize flood
retention cost-benefits, risk, uncertainty, etc.? On the one
hand, the RRRA has the semblance of a comprehensive flood
reduction organization, if phrases like “basin-wide retention,”
196. Marcus Larson, Letter: Retention an Important Flood Control
Component, FMDAM.ORG (Mar. 22, 2014), http://fmdam.org/letter-retention-a
n-important-flood-control-component/.
197. See FARGO-MOORHEAD METROPOLITAN AREA FLOOD RISK MGMT.
PROJECT, REPORT SUMMARY FOR CIVIL WORKS REVIEW BOARD 11 (2001),
available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/CWRB
/fargo/fargo_repsum.pdf (explaining that “buyouts, relocations, ring levees and
easements will be used to mitigate for the upstream impacts to landowners.”).
198. See Scoll, supra note 154, at 25 (describing a culture of self-reliance
with respect to towns mitigating the effects of floods).
199. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012). The Corps settled on
the current upstream retention plan because downstream flood damage
necessitated upstream storage. See DRAFT FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note
179, at ES-14. The National Research Council posited a fundamental question
when it reviewed the Corps’ planning strategies in the late 1990s; it raised
questions about what is counted as benefits and what is counted as costs. See
id. It stated that it is “clearly problem[atic] when land purchased . . . is
counted as a cost while the benefits of open space and ecosystem restoration
are ignored.” NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 72.
200. See FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at ES-5, ES-6.
201. Id.
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“distributed storage,” or “coordinated flood reduction” are given
significant weight. The RRRA’s mission of systematic retention
is not inconsistent with the flood reduction goals of the
Corps.202 Yet on the other hand, the Diversion project may be
best characterized as a sharply focused ambition of the Corps,
despite the reality that the stakeholder interests also
represented by the Corps/Diversion Authority would also
benefit from the RRRA’s efforts, and basin-wide flood retention
generally. If basin-wide flood retention is compatible with the
Diversion project, then perhaps the Corps has thrown out the
baby with the bath water by leaving out comprehensive flood
retention.203
V. THE SCOPE OF THE DIVERSION PROJECT DESIGN
Why did the Corps not choose distributed retention as a
joint-solution to flooding in the RRB? The most likely answer is
that taking on an entire basin was, in fact, unattainable. The
Corps’ narrow formulation of upstream floodwater retention, as
part of the greater Diversion project, may have been limited
due to the Corps’ institutionalized approach to water
management.204 Instead of focusing on systematic floodwater
retention throughout the entire RRB (the sole mission of the
RRRA), the Corps limited its flood retention efforts solely to the
staging and storage area located just upstream from Fargo and
Moorhead.205
In the 1990s, the National Research Council (NRC)
discussed why comprehensive floodwater management might
not survive the Corps’ procedural process.206 It found three
common disagreements between federal interests, represented
by the Corps, and rural/local project sponsors, as measured by
202. See RED RIVER RETENTION AUTHORITY, supra note 187.
203. See Tarlock, supra note 43, at 1317 (“Cost-sharing has also narrowed
the geographic scale of Corps planning at a time when many are asking it to
expand planning to a watershed or river basin scale.”).
204. Scoll, supra note 154, at 26.
205. See Goldfarb, supra note 90, at 490 (“[W]atershed management
activities differ as to organizational locations and structures, scope of
management responsibilities, and primary functional concerns based on
congressional authorizations and historic missions.”).
206. See NEWDIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 72.
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RRRA’s retention efforts in the RRB.207 It should be noted that
even though the Diversion Authority represents the local
sponsors in this instance, and has worked collaboratively with
the Corps,208 the RRRA represents the basin’s divergent
viewpoints on flood control, and is considered a local
counterpart in this context.
The NRC described the first impediment as a “divergence
between national and local benefits,”209 meaning that what is
considered beneficial for the Corps’ purposes (and thus
congressional purposes) might not be beneficial to local area
interests. For example, Minnesota Senator Collin Peterson
said, on flood retention, “[f]rankly, we’re over-building and
spending a bunch of money that we don’t need to spend,”
alternatively arguing that floodwater “impoundment projects”
are building momentum elsewhere.210 Although a
comprehensive water retention system would be ideal,211 its
inclusion did not pass the Corps’ formal cost-benefit analysis,
207. See id.
208. About the Authority, supra note 4.
209. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 72. The Corps found that the
national benefit of a flood retention area immediately preceding Fargo-
Moorhead would have the most immediate and predictable impact on Fargo-
Moorhead, as well as downstream communities. See generally FINAL
FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at ES-7 (detailing the impacts of the
revised LPP plan).
210. See Charles L. Anderson & Larry Lewis, Siting and Design of
Impoundments for Flood Control in the Red River Basin 1–2 (Flood Damage
Reduction Work Group, Working Paper No. 4), available at
http://www.rrwmb.org/files/FDRW/TP04.pdf; Mikkel Pates, Farmers Oppose
Diversion, AGWEEK (Mar. 17, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://www.agweek.com
/event/article/id/22901/; Mikkel Pates, Farmers Question Future in Face of F-M
Diversion Plan, INFORUM, http://www.inforum.com/content/farmers-question
-future-face-f-m-diversion-plan (Mar. 23, 2014, 11:09 PM). “Impoundments are
projects that store flood water,” including the most opportune “native prairie
site[s] with a wetland complex [that has] adjacent restorable wetlands that
may provide flood control or mitigation opportunities.” Anderson & Lewis,
supra.
211. See FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at 27–28 (“Without a
comprehensive flood risk management project in the area, the . . . region will
continue to be subject to flooding and will rely on emergency responses to
ensure the safety of the community.”); see also infra Part V.B. (discussing
systematic retention as a long term flood solution).
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notwithstanding local support for distributed storage as
opposed to a strict diversion design.212
The second issue the NRC found is how funding
constraints limit the Corps’ ability to consider certain project
designs when it reviews project alternatives.213 Amidst the
Diversion project’s initial design phase, a reporter from
Minnesota Public Radio reiterated the woes of local officials
regarding their desire for Congress to move forward with the
diversion design: “[l]ocal officials say they’ve done everything
they can to show Congress they’re serious about the project.
Voters in Fargo and Cass County [North Dakota] approved
sales tax increases to help fund the local share of the
project.”214 On the other hand, Minnesota officials have been
reluctant to “commit funds to the diversion until it wins federal
funding,” which has “upset some on the North Dakota side who
want assurance Minnesota will pay a share of the project’s
cost.”215 Thus, negotiating federal and local funds appears to be
something of a back and forth waltz between Congress, the
Corps, and local project sponsors. Washington needs
assurances that local sponsors are willing to fund their share of
the project before it commits federal dollars; nonfederal
sponsors are loath to commit funds to a project that is
uncertain to win congressional approval; the Corps wants to
submit a feasible project to Congress, backed by local sponsors.
The victims of this sort of brinksmanship are the Fargo-
Moorhead communities, who rely on the project’s “long-term
flood protection” in recent decades where floods have
212. FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at ES-6 (detailing the
plan that brings “the greatest net national economic benefit consistent with
protecting the Nation’s environment.”).
213. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 72; see also Peterson Pushes Flood
Plan for Farm Bill, AGWEEK (July 6, 2010, 10:09 AM),
http://www.agweek.com/event/article/id/16668/ (noting that Senator Collin
Peterson has “broaden[ed] the focus from the diversion alone to watershed
management that embraces doable water retention projects. Both strategies
are necessary for permanent flood control to work.”). The Corps has little
incentive to take on basin-wide water retention projects. See NEW
DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 55.
214. Dan Gunderson, Army Corps Sends Fargo-Moorhead Flood Diversion
Plan to Congress, MPR NEWS (Dec. 20, 2011, 3:24 PM), http://www.mprnews
.org/story/2011/12/20/fargo-moorhead-diversion.
215. Id.
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increasingly worsened.216 In light of this, it seems reasonable
that the Corps recommends a project that garners local
support. If the Corps’ civil works are to benefit anyone, it must
recommend a design that is both favored locally and is
favorable enough to win commitment from the right financial
pockets, as well as Congress. As of late 2011, North Dakota was
a “yes,” Congress a “maybe,” and Minnesota a “we’ll see.”217 In
a paradoxical sense, one can be certain that financial
uncertainty will continue to be an ongoing dilemma in the face
of annual flood events until funding is worked out. However,
the signing of the WRRDA by President Obama in 2014 has
been touted as a “critical step” in securing federal funding.218
The third issue mentioned by the NRC is an offshoot from
the last. The NRC described that differences will arise when
political funding sources lobby for certain project design
characteristics over others.219 Momentum for the Corps’
Diversion project has taken a considerable amount of
politicking.220 The locally supported diversion design has
Congressmen from North Dakota pounding the pavement on
Capitol Hill to protect Fargo and other communities
immediately downstream.221 MPR News reported Senator Kent
Conrad “making the case to his colleagues in Congress that $2
billion is a smart investment” considering a catastrophic flood
could sustain losses nearing $8 to 10 billion.222 Senator Conrad
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Project Status, supra note 41.
219. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 72; see David Kolpack, Fargo
Official: House Bill Important for Diversion, MPR NEWS (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2013/10/25/politics/fargo-official-house-bill-imp
ortant-for-diversion (noting comments from residents living within the
Diversion project’s flood staging area). North Dakota Senators Hoeven and
Heitkamp said “they’re sympathetic to the complaints from upstream
residents.” Id. Furthermore, “Hoeven, a Senate conferee for the farm bill, said
he’s pushing for a provision in the [sic] that bill that would help those and
other rural residents with water retention, water storage and flood
protection.” Id.
220. See Gunderson, supra note 214 (describing the precarious political
context that surrounds federal appropriation for the diversion).
221. Id.
222. Id.
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further stated that “building a diversion or other permanent
flood control works here is very much in the public interest.”223
But, one might ask, whose public interest? The answer
depends on vantage points. One angle, adopted by rural RRB
citizens situated near Fargo-Moorhead, was that before the
controversial upstream retention design was introduced, both
upstream and downstream communities were opposed to the
diversion design.224 In the Diversion project’s original form,
upstream and downstream communities would have
experienced significant losses, which were projected to reach as
far as Canada.225 The Corps and the Diversion Authority’s
position that the original design be the preferred flood control
strategy pitted upstream and downstream communities
against the apparent self-interests of Fargo and Moorhead,
creating an us-versus-them mentality.226 But the advent of the
upstream staging area, as part of the project’s new design,
would decouple the solidarity of upstream and downstream
223. Id. (quoting Senator Kent Conrad of North Dakota).
224. See Dan Gunderson, Latest Diversion Project for Fargo-Moorhead
Faces Fierce Opposition, MPR NEWS (May 25, 2011),
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2011/05/24/flood-diversion (“The first diversion
plan would have caused increased flooding downstream, affecting
communities all the way to the Canadian border.”); Why Are Upstream
Impacts Rather Than Downstream Impacts Being Proposed?, FMDAM.ORG
(Mar. 13, 2012), http://fmdam.org/why-are-upstream-impacts-rather-than-do
wnstream-impacts-being-proposed/ (“[O]fficials have been disingenuous in
presenting the assumed damage to structures upstream and downstream . . . .
[O]fficials are pitting upstream owners against downstream owners to divert
attention away from the benefits being orchestrated for Fargo land
developers.”). When the Corps changed the plan to include an upstream
retention area, it caused “[u]pstream interests, opposed to the new
retention/staging component on their doorstep, [unable] to make common
cause with downstream communities, whom they saw as beneficiaries of the
project’s redesign.” Scoll, supra note 154, at 27.
225. See Scoll, supra note 154, at 26.
226. See Kristen M. Daum, Army Secretary Sends Red River Diversion
Plans to Congress, DIVERSION DISCUSSION (Apr. 3, 2012, 5:55 PM),
http://www.diversiondiscussion.areavoices.com/?p=586 (recognizing that
“[s]everal communities south of Fargo-Moorhead have expressed concern over
the project’s plan to temporarily store water upstream of the diversion, which
could displace at least a few hundred homes and residents” causing upstream
officials to request an “increase [of] the allowable river flows through
downtown Fargo-Moorhead” so that the staging system is used less
frequently).
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communities.227 The Corps could lessen the burden on
downstream communities by including an upstream staging
area, but this would eviscerate upstream communities’ hopes
for flood protection. One upstream citizen felt lost “in a
bureaucratic no man’s land” stating that “[t]his Fargo nice and
North Dakota nice stuff just doesn’t play . . . . [I]t’s been quite
arrogant, the way they treat us. They don’t ask, they tell. And
after awhile I guess you do get a bit cynical.”228
Through litigation, discussed later, upstream citizens
would eventually question the range of alternative flood
solutions explored by the Corps.229 Moreover, the Diversion
project’s absence of a companion distributed retention design to
benefit the entire RRB could mean that scaled down watershed
organizations would be responsible for implementing basin-
wide water retention projects. This could mean that the RRRA
and other substate and state-level agencies are left as the
primary vehicle for water retention initiatives in the RRB.
A. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CORPS’ RECOMMENDATION
Of many possible diversion channel designs, the Corps’
study revealed “three plans of significance to decision
makers.”230 The Corps’ final flood plan precipitated into a
diversion design that would balance its preferred plan (the plan
with the highest NED or the “NED plan” set forth in the P&Gs)
with what is known as the Locally Preferred Plan (LPP).231 The
NED plan “provides the greatest net national economic benefit
consistent with protecting the Nation’s environment.”232 The
NED plan will always be the Corps’ plan of choice unless local
project sponsors can demonstrate otherwise.233 For instance,
227. See Gunderson, supra note 224 (discussing the controversy
surrounding the Corps’ project).
228. Gunderson, supra note 214.
229. See, e.g., Complaint, Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs (D. Minn.) (No. 13-CF-02262) [hereinafter Complaint],
available at http://fmdam.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Richland-Wilkin-Joi
nt-Power-Authority-Complaint-vs-United-States-Army-Corps-of-
Engineers.pdf.
230. FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at ES-6.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See id. at attach. 1 (“The NED plan must be recommended for
implementation unless there are overriding reasons for recommending
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the NED plan may be suspended if “the non-Federal sponsor
identifies a constraint to a project’s physical size or a financial
constraint and if the net benefits are increasing as the
constraint is reached.”234 The Diversion project would meet this
categorical exemption.235
The LPP was the preferred plan of the Diversion
Authority, Fargo, and Moorhead, that would address the
immediate needs of the Fargo-Moorhead metropolitan area
(although the LPP would include the upstream staging area
that would engulf several rural communities).236 The NED plan
was one of two diversion designs on the Minnesota side of the
Red River.237 The LPP would divert floodwaters around Fargo-
Moorhead on the North Dakota side.238 The LPP would be less
effective at reducing flood stages239 than the Minnesota-NED
plan; however, the LPP would benefit a larger downstream
area and directly serve the Fargo-Moorhead metropolitan
communities.240 The other Minnesota plan was a diversion
design developed to set the federal cost-share between
federal/nonfederal project sponsors.241 This plan became known
as the Federally Comparable Plan (FCP)—essentially, a
modification of the original Minnesota-side NED plan.242 The
FCP was an unprecedented deviation from the typical NED
another plan, based on other Federal, state, local and international
concerns.”).
234. CAROL HOLLAWAY, U.S ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS INST. FOR WATER
RES., PROJECT PLANNING IN COLLABORATION WITH GOVERNMENT ENTITIES 27
(2007), http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/Portals/70/docs/iwrreports/07r2.pdf.
235. See id. (clarifying that the Locally Preferred Plan is a categorical
exemption).
236. FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at 105.
237. Id. at ES-6, ES-7.
238. See id. at 105.
239. Flood stages are “[a] height . . . at which a watercourse overtops its
banks and begins to cause damage to any portion of the defined reach.”
DEBARRY, supra note 20, at 667.
240. Letter from Meredith W. B. Temple, Acting Chief of Eng’rs, U.S.
Army, to Sec’y of the Army, Fargo-Moorhead Metropolitan Area Flood Risk
Management Project, North Dakota and Minnesota 2 (Dec. 19, 2011)
[hereinafter Fargo Chief’s Report], available at http://www.usace.army.mil
/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/CWRB/fargo/fargo_chiefsrep.pdf.
241. FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at ES-6, ES-7.
242. See id.
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plan recommended by the Corps. A report issued by the Corps
in July, 2011, compared the three plans:
Normally the NED plan establishes the basis for federal cost sharing
of [an LPP], but in this case the LPP provided fewer total annual
economic benefits than the NED plan . . . . [However, t]he FCP is a
plan that provides comparable total annual economic benefits to the
LPP . . . [and] was used as the basis for federal cost sharing instead
of the NED plan.243
In terms of economic benefits, the FCP was a downward
adjustment from the NED plan.244 The Corps considered the
downward adjustment necessary to marry the economic
benefits found in the LPP with the Corps’ NED plan, hence a
“federally comparable plan.”245 For evaluative purposes,
creating an even basis in benefits between the FCP and the
LPP would assist the Corps in conducting its cost-benefit
analysis.
Significantly, whichever plan the Corps selects is also the
plan that caps the federal contribution to a project’s total
cost.246 Here, the Corps’ contribution to the FCP would cap the
federal contribution to the entire project.247 Likewise, project
alternatives that capture less net NED at a greater cost (the
LPP in this instance) will require additional financial
contributions from nonfederal project sponsors.248 That said, if
243. Id.
244. Id.; see also Fargo Chief’s Report, supra note 240, at 2 (“Since the LPP
provides fewer average annual benefits than the NED plan, a comparable
smaller scale plan with similar outputs to the LPP was identified along the
NED alignment to set the Federal cost share. This plan was identified as the
[FCP] and serves as the basis to determine the project cost sharing
apportionment.”) (emphasis added).
245. See FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at ES-6, ES-7.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 59 (referring to a cost-sharing
case study for a flood damage reduction project on the Napa River). The
original project called for “conventional” flood reduction through structural
measures. Id. However, Napra River residents voted to finance a non-
structural plan through sales tax revenues. Id. The new plan became the LPP
even though there was “higher nonfederal cost of the nonstructural plan, and
a higher total cost than the conventional plan, which was identified as the
NED plan by the Corps . . . .” Id. In that instance, Napa River residents were
able to lobby for a nonstructural LPP—starkly different from the structural
LPP that project stakeholders have advanced for the RRB. Id. Either result
supports the proposition that stakeholder determination influences which
plan the Corps recommends to Congress. See id.
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the Corps recommended the LPP, then the nonfederal sponsors
would be responsible for 100 percent of the excess design and
construction costs over the Corps’ contribution to the FCP.249
The Chief of Engineers for the Corps explained that the FCP
“serves as the basis to determine the project cost sharing
apportionment. Federal investment in the flood risk
management features of the LPP is capped at the investment
that would have been made for the FCP . . . .”250
The metropolitan sponsors were more than willing to take
on the additional cost.251 Shortly after metropolitan
stakeholders promised the necessary funds to cover additional
expenses for the LPP, the Corps discarded either Minnesota
alternative.252 Instead, the Corps recommended the LPP to
meet the needs of the Fargo-Moorhead stakeholders.253 The
Corps stated:
The environmentally preferable plan is the Minnesota diversion
channel [FCP] . . . . It has fewer impacts to wetlands, tributaries and
fish passage when compared to other alternatives in the final array
of alternatives. It was not selected because it did not address
flooding from all five of the tributaries in the metropolitan area,
which was a desired outcome of the non-federal sponsors.254
The Corps acknowledged that many environmental
benefits would be lost if the LPP were recommended.255
However, the LPP was recommended because it could protect
against flood-prone tributaries near Fargo, which was desired
by stakeholders who were willing to pay for the added
249. Fargo Chief’s Report, supra note 240, at 2.
250. Id.
251. Kolpack, supra note 176 (asserting that money spent preventing flood
damage is money well-spent).
252. See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, RECORD OF DECISION, FARGO-MOORHEAD
METROPOLITAN AREA FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT PROJECT, NORTH DAKOTA
AND MINNESOTA 2 (2012), available at www.fmdiversion.com/pdf/DA%20
Packets/2012/AUTHORITY-BOARD-MTG-AGENDA-04-12-2012.pdf.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.; Memorandum from William R. Taylor, Director, Office of Envtl.
Policy and Compliance, to Theodore A. Brown, Chief, Planning and Policy
Div., U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 1–2 (Oct. 24, 2011) (on file with the United
States Department of the Interior) [hereinafter Memorandum of William R.
Taylor], available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks
/CWRB/fargo/fargo_stagncy_coms.pdf (stating that diversion alternatives
would have adverse ecological impacts, but the FCP Minnesota plan is less
damaging than the LPP North Dakota plan).
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protection.256 Despite this alluring aspect, the Corps’ formal
valuation process revealed that both economic and
environmental benefits of the LPP were less than the
Minnesota NED plan in terms of cost-benefit.257 However, the
benefits conferred on the metropolitan area, albeit at a
disproportionately greater cost, admittedly exceeded the
benefits purported in the NED plan (i.e., the LPP would protect
against five tributaries), but the Corps could not justify the
LPP’s cost-benefit, unless project stakeholders were willing to
increase their financial contribution.258
Thus, there exists the inescapable reality that the Corps’
planning process might lop off, versus carve out, exemptions for
local project preferences. The “Locally Preferred Plan” is really
a misnomer. There are those, such as the U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service259 and upstream communities,260 who would argue that
the Diversion project is not the preferred plan at all, and that
maybe “local” is a relative term which should also mean
“regional.” On the other hand, proponents argue that the
Diversion project directly benefits Fargo and Moorhead, is
nonfederally funded by Fargo and Moorhead, and ergo, is really
just a community’s solution to a community problem.261 For
instance, facing the possibility of yet another flood event in
2013, local leaders would use a “communitywide campaign” to
256. FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at 42.
North Dakota alignments cross five tributaries (Wild Rice, Sheyenne,
Maple, Lower Rush, and Rush Rivers); Minnesota alignments cross
none. Tributary crossings introduce additional environmental
impacts. Tributary crossings provide flood risk reduction for flood
events on the tributaries as well as the Red River. The North Dakota
alignment benefits a greater geographic area and removes 50 more
square miles from the 1-percent chance event floodplain than the
Minnesota alignment. The sponsors and a majority of stakeholders
preferred a North Dakota alignment.
Id.
257. See FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at ES-6.
258. Cf. id.
259. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
260. See Gunderson, supra note 214.
261. See, e.g., Kolpack, supra note 176 (“[T]he canal is the only way to
protect the Fargo metropolitan area from catastrophic floods like the one in
2009.”).
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bolster support for the Diversion project, which to them, could
“fix the area’s nagging problem once and for all.”262
B. THE EFFECT ONUPSTREAM COMMUNITIES AND
DISAGREEMENT IN RETENTION STRATEGIES
The Diversion project has shaken RRB citizens’ support
from the beginning.263 It has spawned local buzzwords like “the
opposition” which means those generally opposed to the project;
it has spurred the creation of whistleblower news organizations
such as FMDam.org, whose mission is to ”investigate and
disseminate news, research, commentary and editorials” on the
Diversion.264 But opinions were sharply divided at the
inception of the upstream staging area.265 Initially, small
upstream communities within the staging area found little
common ground with their metropolitan beneficiaries.266 Since
then, the communities have proffered their own ideas on how to
alleviate adverse effects from the upstream staging area.267 The
principal supporters of the LPP were Fargo-Moorhead and
those within the immediate floodplain areas who found safe
harbor from nearby tributaries.268 The Corps justified the LPP
and upstream staging area as a means to reduce flooding
downstream, even though increased flooding upstream within
the storage area would cause collateral damage to the
communities within.269
262. Id.
263. See id. (“[Opponents] think[] a series of smaller, less costly anti-flood
measures would better serve Red River communities.”).
264. Mission Statement, FMDAM.ORG, http://fmdam.org/mission-statement/
(last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
265. Is the Real, Hidden Purpose for the Staging Area to Serve as a Water
Supply for Fargo?, FMDAM.ORG (Mar. 12, 2012), http://fmdam.org/is-the-real-h
idden-purpose-for-the-staging-area-to-serve-as-a-water-supply-for-fargo/
(calling the stated purpose of the staging area “counter-intuitive”); see also
McFeely infra note 272.
266. See Gunderson, supra note 224. But see infra Part VI.B.
267. Becky Parker, Concerned Citizens in Red River Valley Gather to
Discuss Flood Control, WDAY (Jan. 23, 2014, 9:32 PM), http://www.wday
.com/content/concerned-citizens-red-river-valley-gather-discuss-flood-control.
268. See Scoll, supra note 154, at 27 (“The cities of Fargo and Moorhead
were, of course, strongly supportive.”).
269. FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at ES-13 (“In order to
eliminate downstream impacts, upstream staging and storage of
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Some argued that if long term flood solutions,270 like
systematic water retention and detention, had been
incorporated during the initial project design,271 the upstream
LPP staging area would have experienced improved flood
protection while reducing the chances of drowning out
upstream communities.272 That is, had the Corps specifically
coordinated basin-wide retention initiatives as part of the
Diversion project from its inception, inundation of communities
within the flood staging area could have been reduced, or at a
minimum, early coordination may have helped the
communities plan for the event through retention and
detention projects of their own. Indeed, that very discussion
dates back to the 1990s when local “conflict between draining
and retaining water flared with lawsuits and a moratorium on
new projects that stopped work on flood storage for several
years.”273 Since then the Diversion project has beckoned a
“broader discussion about flood control” in light of its design
approximately 200,000 acre-feet immediately upstream of the diversion
channel inlet would be required.”).
270. RED RIVER BASIN COMM’N, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 9–10 (2012),
available at www.redriverbasincommission.org/Reports/2012_Annual_Rpt.pdf
(discussing how the Long Term Flood Solutions Project focuses on efforts to
look at basin storage strategies to reduce flows on the tributaries and the Red
River).
271. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ST. PAUL DIST., FINAL FARGO-
MOORHEAD FEASIBILITY REPORT AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
app. U-4 (2011) [hereinafter FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT APPENDIX], available
at http://www.fmdiversion.com/pdf/CorpsReports1/Appendix_U_SDEIS_Public
_and_Private_Summarized_Comments_and_Corps_Responses.pdf (arguing for
a basin-wide perspective).
272. See Retention Study Underway, F-M AREA DIVERSION (Dec. 2012),
http://www.fmdiversion.com/newsdetails.php?ID=68 (“An initiative is
underway which could lead to retention efforts being incorporated into flood
control plans in the Red River Basin. These efforts to retain water in various
locations would also complement and improve the performance of the Fargo-
Moorhead Area Diversion Project.”). Contra Mike McFeely, Study Says
Retention Can’t Replace F-M Diversion “Staging Area”, KFGO BLOG (Nov. 21,
2013, 1:01 PM), http://kfgo.com/blogs/so-many-opinions-so-little-time
/953/study-says-retention-cant-replace-f-m-diversion-staging-area/ (“[W]ater
retention along the tributaries of the Red River cannot replace the proposed
Fargo-Moorhead Area Diversion Project’s upstream ‘staging area,’ nor can
solely holding back water provide the benefits for the F-M metro area the
diversion will provide.”).
273. Dan Gunderson, As Red River Diversion Advances, a Call for
Floodwater Retention, MPR NEWS (Mar. 25, 2010),
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2010/03/25/red-river-valley-flood-retention.
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features,274 which could rehash the draining-retaining debate
of the 1990s.
Although the LPP itself would add some benefit to water
retention initiatives, it was a drop in the bucket compared to
the twenty percent net flow reduction the Red River Basin
Commission (RRBC) envisioned through basin-wide retention
planning275 (even though some diversion supporters argued
basin-wide retention was purposefully left out,276 and that a
twenty percent net flow reduction alone would be insufficient to
save Fargo-Moorhead).277 But given the structure of the Corps’
project planning process, a lack of comprehensiveness could
have been expected.278
A review of the preceding discussion reveals the following.
First, under the Corps’ own admission, the Minnesota plans
mitigated environmental losses to a greater degree, and had
the support of other federal agencies.279 But the LPP
supporters were willing to cover the additional costs it would
take to shield Fargo-Moorhead from an infrequent, although
costlier flood event.280 This can be viewed as an implicit
limitation of cost sharing.281 In the eyes of metropolitan project
stakeholders, widening the scope of the project would not
significantly benefit them.282 Second, the Corps narrowed its
274. Id.
275. LONG TERM FLOOD SOLUTIONS, supra note 140, at 119 (“Retention to
achieve the potential 20 percent flow reduction on the main stem should be
aggressively pursued upstream of Fargo-Moorhead to decrease the duration,
scope, and level of floods in the Fargo-Moorhead area, downstream
communities, and rural areas.”).
276. See Mark Bordshaug, Letter: Selective Criticism Misleads, INFORUM
(Nov. 4, 2013, 10:01 PM), http://www.inforum.com/content/letter-selective
-criticism-misleads.
277. McFeely, supra note 272.
278. See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 70 (identifying three distinct
paths the Corps is likely to follow).
279. Memorandum of William R. Taylor, supra note 255, at 1 (submitting
that any diversion alternative will have adverse ecological impacts, however,
the FCP Minnesota plan is less damaging than the LPP North Dakota plan).
280. Fargo Chief’s Report, supra note 240, at 3 (“The recommended LPP
would significantly reduce risk to the Fargo-Moorhead metropolitan area from
a flood which has a 1-percent chance of occurrence in any year . . . .”).
281. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 73.
282. See FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT APPENDIX, supra note 271, at app. U-4
(“Some comments questioned the scope of the study and the focus on the
Fargo-Moorhead Metro area instead of a basin-wide study . . . . While
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project studies to only consider measures that would chiefly
benefit the metropolitan area because of its immediate flood
risk.283 The Corps viewed systematic storage alternatives, such
as retention sites, as inefficient, but with further deliberation
stated that standing alone, “[if] several storage sites were
created over a large area, the system could have substantial
cumulative benefits for relatively small and frequent flood
events.”284 However, this point was overturned because, among
other things, a system of storage sites would not protect
against a large and infrequent flood, and would be “less
effective in reducing flood risk in the Fargo-Moorhead Metro
area.”285 However, it remains to be seen whether a different
project design,286 or several well placed upstream storage sites,
in combination with the Diversion project, could have spared
upstream communities some of their current hardships had
retention been strongly considered as a viable option during the
initial planning stages.
C. EARLY FORMULATION OF ADIVERSIONDESIGN
Basin-wide retention planning, as a long term flood
solution, rarely meets formal federal cost-benefit criteria to
receive federal funding.287 For this reason, some project options
are never considered.288 For example, the Corps determined
that implementing a system of retention sites would have to be
incremental, cover an extended geographical area, and would
also take a very long time to implement.289 The Corps’
alternatives were considered from a basin-wide perspective . . . [t]he Corps of
Engineers and other local, state and federal agencies are studying flood risk
throughout the Red River Basin under separate efforts.”) (emphasis added); id.
at U-10 (explaining that an expansive retention design “would not
substantially reduce flood risk to the Fargo-Moorhead area.”); McFeely, supra
note 272.
283. FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT APPENDIX, supra note 271, at U-4.
284. See id.
285. Id.
286. See Parker, supra note 267.
287. LONG TERM FLOOD SOLUTIONS, supra note 140, at 106.
288. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 72.
289. FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT APPENDIX, supra note 271 (suggesting that
incremental installation of flood storage sites would result in delayed flood
protection, and that a large geographical area was outside the intended scope
of the FM Diversion project).
2015] FLOOD DIVERSION PROJECT 593
explanation suggests that comprehensive retention was an
infeasible component of the Diversion project from the
outset.290 Citizens raised concern about the narrow scope of the
Corps’ EIS study during one of the Diversion project’s public
comment periods.291 The study team decided that a system of
stand-alone retention sites in upstream watersheds involved
more risk (in terms of monetizing flood protection) than a
diversion design, and that either option would require
comparable funding.292 The Corps chose the Diversion project,
instead of a retention system, because the former involved less
flood risk.293 However, sole reliance on one strategy over
another might illicit such a disjunctive solution.294
Viewing basin-wide retention as either the principle
solution, or as a secondary initiative to the Diversion project,295
does not remedy the situation, it merely understates the issue.
Basin-wide storage designs should have been an integral
component of the Diversion project design from the outset. To
suggest that comprehensive design alternatives were not a
“necessity”296 for the Diversion project and the RRB generally,
is really a matter of what is at stake.
The real question is: could the RRB have been an
exception? There are a few features of the RRB that may have
supported a Corps-backed basin-wide retention plan. First,
nearly seventy-five percent of the original wetlands formerly
holding water in the RRB have been drained.297 This has
essentially diminished the RRB’s capacity to store water
naturally.298 In fact, the Corps is adept at restoring habitats
that “mimic prediversion waterflows”299 and even oversees
wetland operations via permitting. Thus, a Corps-administered
290. See id.
291. Id. at U-3.
292. FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT, supra note 137, at 39–40.
293. Id. at 40.
294. Id. at 38–40 (eliminating different plans as alternatives).
295. See Bordshaug, supra note 276 (stating that flood reduction through a
system of upstream storage sites has traditionally been viewed as a secondary
benefit to the primary goal of diverting water around Fargo-Moorhead).
296. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 55.
297. Andrew P. Manela et al., Waffles Are Not Just for Breakfast Anymore,
61 J. WATER& SOIL CONSERVATION 52A, 54A (2006).
298. Id.
299. Karkkainen, supra note 45, at 968.
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system of retention sites might have worked well to mimic the
RRB’s former holding capacity.300 The ability of rural
nonfederal sponsors to finance this sort of undertaking is
conjectural at this point.301 Second, the RRB is “relatively
small” compared to other basins,302 which support the policy of
developing basin-wide solutions in terms of purchasing power
and man power. A larger basin will probably require more of
each. That said, there may be an endogenous amount of RRB
water organizations that could unite around a common goal of
distributed water retention, much like how members of the
Diversion Authority rallied for a diversion design. Third,
outside of Fargo and Moorhead, the RRB’s geographical
features are contiguous—more or less “very flat” and
“homogenous in terms of land use.”303 Some of the obstructions
one might face in a more densely populated area might
preclude a distributed water retention system, but not for the
RRB.304 Fourth, the RRB has many local water organizations
working to aid rural areas in structuring their water
management practices.305 Although a number of these
organizations must work within their jurisdiction, they are
familiar with the RRB’s flood retention efforts.
D. UPSTREAM COMMUNITIES ARE CHALLENGING THE BREADTH
OF ALTERNATIVES RECOMMENDED BY THE CORPS AND
MINNESOTA APPROVAL IS STILL PENDING
Ongoing litigation, the result of which could retroactively
change the design of the Diversion project, has become a
significant form of recourse for upstream communities within
the staging area.306 A pending suit of great importance here
involves two upstream counties (Richland County, North
Dakota and Wilkin County, Minnesota, or “the Counties”)
acting collectively under a Joint Powers Authority
300. Id.
301. See BOB FREITAG ET AL., FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT: A NEW
APPROACH FOR ANEW ERA 113–14 (2009).
302. Hearne, supra note 101, at 842.
303. Id. at 843.
304. Negotiating land easements on valuable farm land would likely be a
major hurdle. See infra note 330 and accompanying text.
305. Hearne, supra note 101, at 842.
306. See text accompanying infra notes 307–11.
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agreement.307 The Counties are directly impacted by the
staging area upstream from Fargo-Moorhead.308 The Counties
challenge the Corps on its failure to “advise Congress of
suitable alternative plans of flood control.”309 Specifically, the
Counties believe that the cost-benefit analysis of the original
LPP was “arbitrarily manipulated” to canvas its cost-benefit
inequities, “which originally showed that the [LPP] would cost
significantly more than the benefits.”310
A basin-wide approach is a focus of the Counties’
complaint: “rather than taking such an approach, the Corps,
heavily influenced by the City of Fargo, ultimately rejected
more moderate alternatives (which would not have resulted in
upstream flooding) on the grounds that they did not eliminate
(as opposed to dramatically reduce) the risk of flooding in
Fargo-Moorhead.”311 The Counties were quick to point out that
the 1998 mediation settlement agreement stipulated a future
policy objective of comprehensive basin-wide flood reduction.312
307. Complaint, supra note 229. Specifically, the Joint Powers Authority
represents over “20 cities, townships and a school district in addition to the
county members.” Id. at 8.
308. See Letter from Don Moffet, Chairman, Richland Cnty. Water Res.
Dis., to Aaron Snyder, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (June 24, 2013) (on file with
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) (“The Richland County Water Resource Board
understands and agrees that Fargo needs protection; however, all other
options should be considered and all viable options taken to protect those
[counties] to the south of the project and to protect the money of all
taxpayers.”).
309. Complaint, supra note 229, at 3. According to the Counties, the Fargo
Chief’s Report should have made mention to plans other than the LPP, and
that the Environmental Impact Statement did not contain adequate
information to inform Congress of suitable alternatives. Id. at 3–4. See
Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Authority v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 13-
2262 at 3 (D. Minn. Aug. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Preliminary Injunction]
(granting the Diversion Authority’s motion for a preliminary injunction). The
Counties brought a separate state court action “against the Diversion
Authority (but not the Corps) seeking to enjoin the construction of the O-H-B
ring levees on the ground that the diversion project has not yet been approved
through the State of Minnesota’s environmental review process.” Id at 2–3.
The court determined that the Counties seek “essentially the same relief” in
both actions. Id. at 3. See infra Part VI.B (on O-H-B ring levees).
310. Complaint, supra note 229, at 4.
311. Preliminary Injunction, supra note 309, at 11.
312. The agreement, among other things, stipulated that “[t]he
comprehensive watershed planning process should be used to address changes
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Furthermore, the Counties believe that affirmations of a basin-
wide policy objective were made to Congress during the course
of the Diversion project’s development.313 The crux of the
Counties’ argument is that a systematic flood reduction
strategy was not wholly considered as a wholesale option, nor
part and parcel of the Corps’ Fargo-Moorhead flood
initiative.314 As a result, once the Corps decided to incorporate
a storage area upstream from Fargo-Moorhead, the Counties
were left defenseless against the inundation.315 On this point,
the Counties argue that after the original project design had
to the flow regime resulting from increased development and land use
change.”MEDIATION AGREEMENT, supra note 85, at 19.
313. Fargo-Moorhead Metro Area Flood Control and Red River Basin Flood
Control Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Water Dev. of the
S. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. 10 (2009) (prepared statement of
Colonel Jon Christensen, Dist. Commander, St. Paul Dist., Army Corps of
Eng’rs) [hereinafter Statement of Colonel Jon Christensen], available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg55140/pdf/CHRG-111shrg55140
.pdf.
The Corps of Engineers initiated the Fargo-Moorhead Metropolitan
Feasibility Study at the request of the city of Fargo, North Dakota
and the city of Moorhead, Minnesota in September 2008. The goal of
the study is to develop a regional system to reduce flood risk . . . . The
study will evaluate several alternatives, including non-structural
measures, relocation of flood-prone structures, levees and floodwalls,
diversion channels, and flood storage . . . . First, we will develop a
number of stand alone alternatives, those being nonstructural
measures, levees and floodwalls, and diversion channels. Second, we
will combine the stand alone alternatives to form combination
alternatives. Finally, we will take advantage of the work being
conducted as part of the Fargo-Moorhead Upstream Feasibility Study
to assess the potential benefits that flood storage may provide . . . . If
there appears to be a federally justifiable plan the remaining
alternatives with the greatest potential of becoming the National
Economic Development plan will be carried forward and optimized,
potentially leading to a Report of the Chief of Engineers . . . . Local
input will be the foundation for the alternatives and the basis for
future plan development.
Id.
314. See Complaint, supra note 229, at 13 (recognizing that uncoordinated
projects might cause more problems than they correct; “[t]he mediated
settlement reflected Minnesota’s agreement with the Corps and other State
and Federal entities that flood control projects would be evaluated from a
basin wide perspective. Selection of the Locally Preferred Plan violates the
mediated settlement agreement”); Preliminary Injunction, supra note 309, at
11 (“The Joint Powers further alleges that the Corps then failed to consider a
variety of options for flood storage . . . .”).
315. See Preliminary Injunction, supra note 309, at 4.
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been narrowed to a diversion design alone, but before the
decision was made to include an upstream staging area into the
original project design (due to unanticipated hydrological
effects downstream),316 that screening out a remedial basin-
wide retention plan a second time showed the Corps’
indifference to the communities.317
Furthermore, the Counties argue that the new upstream
staging area cannot stand on its own without authorization
under Minnesota state law.318 The Flood Control Act of 1944
mandates the following with respect to all federal works:
316. Gunderson, supra note 224 (reporting that “the first diversion design
would have caused increased flooding downstream, affecting communities all
the way to the Canadian border.”).
317. The Complaint, supra note 229, at 19, states:
Months after issuing its draft environmental impact statement, the
Corps of Engineers discovered that the Locally Preferred Plan would
also cause unacceptable downstream flood damage. This damage
would result from the failure of the project to incorporate design
features that would eliminate such damage, features that had
arbitrarily been eliminated in the environmental review—including
the elimination of smaller distributed storage options, elimination of
waffle plan options [see infra note 328] and the decision to eliminate
and develop over fifty square miles of natural floodplain, and the
failure to configure flow through Fargo in Moorhead in the most
effective way.
See also Statement of Colonel Jon Christensen, supra note 313, at 10
(referring to the Fargo-Moorhead Metropolitan Feasibility Study’s goal to
“develop a regional system to reduce flood risk”). Ironically, the town of
Oxbow, North Dakota was included in the study. Id. Currently, Oxbow is one
of the communities preparing for the adverse effects of the upstream staging
area. See id.
318. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ST. PAUL DIST., FARGO
MOORHEAD METROPOLITAN AREA FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT PROJECT app. E-
2 (2013), available at http://www.fmdiversion.com/pdf/CorpsEA
/Appendices/Appendix%20E%20-%20Public%20Comments.pdf [hereinafter
SUPPLEMENTAL EA APPENDIX E] (“As the responsible government unit (RGU),
the DNR is responsible for determining the extent to which federal
[environmental review] documents address state scope and content
requirements.”); Complaint, supra note 229, at 4–5 (“The Environmental
Impact Statement failed to address significant Minnesota regulatory
requirements, thereby forcing the State of Minnesota to conduct a lengthy and
costly environmental review process, a process which could have been
significantly truncated or eliminated, if a less costly and less damaging
alternative were selected.”); Preliminary Injunction, supra note 309, at 6
(stating that Minnesota “prohibits state action ‘significantly affecting the
quality of the environment . . . so long as there is a feasible and prudent
alternative . . . .’”) (citing MINN. STAT. § 116D.04 subdiv. 6 (2013)).
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In connection with the exercise of jurisdiction over the rivers of the
Nation . . . it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to
recognize the interests and rights of the States in determining the
development of watersheds within their borders . . . to facilitate the
consideration of projects on a basis of comprehensive and
coordinated development . . . .319
Pursuant to this power, the MN DNR has been reluctant to
sign off on modifications to the Diversion project without first
investigating environmental impacts.320 Disagreement over the
staging area’s environmental impacts is still an ongoing
issue.321 However, despite current litigation and federal
requirements that the project have state authorization, the
Diversion project continues its scheduled development.322
319. Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887. Minnesota
further requires supplemental planning on the local level. MINN. R. 6120.5900
subpt. 1 (2008).
320. See MINN. DEP’T NATURAL RES., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
WORKSHEET 14 (2013), http://files.dnr.state.mn.us/input/environmentalreview
/fm_flood_risk/fm_seaw_accessible_sa_cmts_signature_v2.pdf.
321. Compare SUPPLEMENTAL EA APPENDIX E, supra note 318, at 30
(explaining that despite the unlikelihood that the Diversion project would
cause geomorphological changes, “the Minnesota Department of Natural
Resources continued to be concerned that the Project could disrupt geomorphic
process and cause bank instability”), with MINN. DEP’T NATURAL RES., FARGO-
MOORHEAD FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT PROJECT DRAFT SCOPING DECISION 1,
12, 14 (2013), http://files.dnr.state.mn.us/input/environmentalreview/fm_flood
_risk/2013_0408_draft_scoping_decision_for_public_comment.pdf (discussing
social and economic effects, and “a potential for significant increase in impacts
to wetlands in the staging area”).
322. Press Release, United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, St. Paul Dist.,
Corps of Engineers Releases Final Environmental Assessment Package for
Changes to Proposed Fargo, N.D./Moorhead, Minn., Diversion Channel (Sept.
20, 2013) (on file with author), available at http://www.mvp.usace.army
.mil/Media/NewsReleases/tabid/9473/Article/488697/corps-of-engineers-release
s-final-environmental-assessment-package-for-changes.aspx (“Col. Daniel C.
Koprowski, commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul District,
signed a ‘Finding of No Significant Impact’ for a final Environmental
Assessment, or EA, Sept. 19, completed for the proposed Fargo,
N.D./Moorhead, Minn., Metropolitan Area Flood Risk Management Project.”).
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VI. FEDERAL FUNDING OF SINGLE-PURPOSE PROJECTS
WILL CONTINUE TO PREVENT COMPREHENSIVE
FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT
A. PROPOSED FLOOD RETENTION STRATEGIES
No matter what issues the upstream litigation resolves,
one thing is still certain: basin-wide retention planning must be
resilient.323 The Counties carry a message that many RRB
citizens share. They are weary that the Corps’ recommended
plan has “not been studied sufficiently” and will have a “much
greater negative effect than estimated.”324 Their trepidations
are persuasive, and emphasize many points about the Corps’
recommendation to Congress.325
First, the Corps’ current flood planning framework
continues to discourage comprehensiveness.326 The RRB
presents an opportunity to capitalize on basin-wide flood
retention projects, by exploiting economies of scale inherent in
water retention systems.327 However, the risk in investing in a
system like this is often a major setback even for rural
communities who realize its value:
[D]ownstream communities seeking to mitigate the risk of flooding
are not likely to choose or invest in agricultural conservation
practices that manage water runoff over conventional approaches
without hard numbers. What is needed [is] the quantification of the
risk reduction achieved by these practices and the estimation of
their costs relative to conventional flood mitigation approaches of
dams, dikes, and impoundments.328
323. LONG TERM FLOOD SOLUTIONS, supra note 140, at 5.
324. MNDAK UPSTREAM COALITION, http://www.mndakupstreamcoali
tion.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
325. See id.
326. See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 55 (“There are no particular
incentives for the Corps to emphasize basinwide planning, which results in a
lack of comprehensiveness in the Corps’ planning processes for type A
projects.”).
327. See id. (“[S]ubstantial economies of scale can be achieved through the
use of multiple-purpose projects or reservoirs.”).
328. Manela et al., supra note 297, at 53A (advocating for a “Waffle
concept” design as an effective flood control strategy for the Red River Basin).
The authors of this article describe the Waffle concept:
Under watershed or basin-wide implementation of the Waffle concept,
spring runoff is temporarily stored in the waffle-like topography of
the landscape—low relief fields, depressions, and ditches—in the
event of extreme flood risk. [A]fter the flood crest and the risk of
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On the other hand, researchers have concluded that a
system of water storage in the RRB, due to the amenability of
its topography and infrastructure,329 is both economically
feasible and sustainable.330 The Corps decided against that
alternative—what became known as the “Waffle” concept—for
reasons analogous to those detailed above:
The “Waffle” concept was specifically explored as a water storage
alternative . . . . On a basin-wide scale, the “Waffle” could produce
flood stage reductions over a large area, and cumulative benefits to
the basin. However, the “Waffle” would not substantially reduce
flood risk to the Fargo-Moorhead area. In addition, the “Waffle”
would be costly to implement and could likely not be implemented in
a period of less than 10 years. Like other storage alternatives
considered, the study team determined that the “Waffle” approach
was relatively ineffective and inefficient. Other alternatives were
found to be more effective at reducing flood risk in Fargo-Moorhead
and more efficient in that they could be implemented for a lower
cost. A flood storage system does provide some level of flood risk
reduction, particularly for the smaller, more frequent flood events;
downstream flooding have passed, the stored water would be released
in a controlled manner.
Id. at 55A.
329. See id. at 54A (stating further that “[t]hese storage areas,
supplemented by roads and drainage structures, could act as a network of
channels and control structures to slowly release stored water into the Red
River after the flood crest passes.”).
330. See id. at 56A (relying on statistics of a major flood event in 1997,
researchers determined that with a Waffle design, “doubling or tripling the
amount of acreage to account for uncertainty would compare favorably to the
roughly $2 to $4 billion in damages that could have been avoided.
Conventional approaches would have cost far more even if a sufficient number
of dikes, dams, and impoundments could have been constructed to store the
necessary amount of water.”). Contra Steve Shultz & Jay Leitch, Landowner
Compensation for Dispersed Temporary Water Storage to Mitigate Low
Frequency Flooding 1 (Universities Council on Water Res./Nat’l Inst. of Water
Res. Annual Conference (Hazards in Water Resources), Working Paper No. 42,
2007), available at http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1017&context=ucowrconfs_2007.
The land rental costs associated with Waffle storage . . . do not
include any program administration fees or implementation costs.
The land rental costs are particularly large since the most optimal
storage locations (from a hydrological standpoint) are where land
values in the RRB are highest . . . . These resulting high land rental
costs are shown to limit the economic feasibility of Waffle storage,
particularly since more than $600 million has been spent on flood
mitigation projects in the RRB since the large-scale flood event of
1997.
Id.
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however, the level of risk that remains for the larger, less frequent
flood events is not a tolerable level of risk. Flood storage
alternatives, including the “Waffle Project,” do not effectively
address the identified problem of flooding in the Metro area.331
Again, the amount of time it would take to implement a
comprehensive project of this magnitude fell outside the Corps’
planning parameters.332 It is plausible, however, that had the
Waffle design (or some other flood storage alternative) took
effect at the start of the project’s planning phase, that the
upstream communities may have averted danger.333
Second, the Waffle design is just one of many systematic
water retention strategies. The current paradigm is to move
from the traditional approach of channel conveyance to
restoring the natural flow of rivers,334 and designing
distributed flood retention systems to mimic the natural water-
releasing function of pervious wetlands.335 Wetland-like storage
can be achieved through technical measures (large construction
projects and other unnatural designs like the Waffle concept)
and nontechnical measures, like the natural retention capacity
of existing wetlands or prairie potholes.336 Research suggests
that the “natural capability of a catchment” in combination
with nontechnical and technical flood reduction measures (such
as the Waffle) is a comprehensive way to slow runoff and
reduce peak flows during the flood season.337
Now consider that the Corps’ decision on a diversion design
was made, in large part, due to other storage design
alternatives (not limited to the Waffle design) posing too much
331. FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT APPENDIX, supra note 271, at U-10.
332. See id.
333. See Complaint, supra note 229, at 13–14.
334. See INT’L JOINT COMM’N, supra note 138, at 21; cf. Hearne & Kritsky,
supra note 93, at 910 (finding that local water management districts “that
enter into more joint powers agreements are less concerned with traditional
drainage and water movement activities.”).
335. See Quentin B. Travis & Larry W. Mays, Optimizing Retention Basin
Networks, 134 J. WATER RESOURCES PLANNING&MGMT. 432, 432 (2008).
336. See Christian Reinhardt et al., Decentralised Water Retention Along
the River Channels in a Mesoscale Catchment in South-Eastern Germany, 36
PHYSICS&CHEMISTRY EARTH 309, 310 (2011).
337. Jens Bölscher et al., Flash Flood Retention in Headwater Areas of the
Natzchung River Using Small Retarding Basins, in FLOODS: FROM RISK TO
OPPORTUNITY 153, 154 (Ali Chavoshian et al. ed., 2013).
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risk and uncertainty.338 In 1995, the NRC identified risk
assessment as a serious issue for the Corps under its P&Gs,
and indicated the same in 1999.339 Lately the NRC has advised
the Corps that it should continue to use the P&Gs, but to pay
significant attention to its undervaluation of a project’s
environmental outputs.340 The Council made its
recommendation in terms of environmental restoration
projects, asserting that “the Corps has not adequately
emphasized the fact that restoration measures often yield
traditional NED benefits (e.g., when wetland rehabilitation
reduces flood peaks and thus provides NED flood damage
reduction benefits).”341 This draws an uncanny parallel to the
Diversion project’s absence of distributed retention, and the
Corps’ justification for dismissing that solution altogether.342
Third, cost sharing tends to promote single purpose
projects.343 The Diversion project is a good example. For
instance, the permissible range of federal cost sharing with
local sponsors is set at a minimum of thirty-five percent, not to
exceed fifty percent.344 In application this can create a sliding
338. See FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT APPENDIX, supra note 271, at U-10.
339. AMERICAN RIVER BASIN, supra note 35, at 211–12; NEW DIRECTIONS,
supra note 17, at 8.
340. See COORDINATING COMM., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS WATER RESOURCES PLANNING: A NEW OPPORTUNITY
FOR SERVICE 5–6 (2004).
341. Id. at 6.
342. See FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT APPENDIX, supra note 271, at U-3.
343. See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 55. Lower-income
communities typically struggle to find federal assistance for flood damage
reduction projects. Id. In part, this is because lower income communities
typically score low on the “flood plain inventory,” a tool used to determine the
values of various types of structures within communities of the affected flood
plain. James J. Comiskey, Overview of Flood Damages Prevented by U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers Flood Control Reduction Program and Activities, 130 J.
CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 13, 16 (2005). Metropolitan areas would have
a clear advantage over smaller rural communities under this analysis.
344. See Water Resources Development Act, Pub. L. No. 104-303, §
202(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3658, 3673 (1996); see also Memorandum from Major
General Russell L. Furhman, Director of Civil Works, for Commanders, Major
Subordinate Commands, Policy Guidance Letter (PGL) No. 51, Flood Control
Cost Sharing (July 18, 1997), available at http://planning.usace.army.mil
/toolbox/library/PGL/pgl51.pdf (“In accordance with Section 202(a)(1) of WRDA
96, the minimum non-Federal cost share for structural flood control projects
will be 35 percent. The maximum non-Federal cost share will continue to be
50 percent.”); Fargo Chief’s Report, supra note 240, at 4 (stating that the
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scale of control over project selection because local funding
authorities—those represented by the Diversion Authority—
have the financial clout to essentially purchase desirable
projects.345 Conversely, rural communities have fewer
“capabilities” in terms of money and less political power to
construct legitimate flood reduction projects for themselves.346
The Diversion Authority realized that working together was
the only way it could coordinate the Diversion project and
allocate fiscal responsibility.347 The Diversion Authority
enhanced its capabilities “by bringing together more people and
a wider variety of stakeholders” to lobby the Corps for a single
purpose diversion design.348 Some of the small communities
upstream are also expanding their capabilities, under the guise
of the MnDak Upstream Coalition, plaintiff to the upstream
litigation against the Corps.349
B. THEOXBOW, HICKSON, BAKKE RING LEVEE: DISPLACING
FLOODWATER AROUNDCOMMUNITY INTERESTS
Three impacted upstream communities, Oxbow, Hickson,
and Bakke, North Dakota, (O-H-B) are among those affected by
the staging area.350 After the decision to include an upstream
nonfederal sponsors of the Diversion project must “[p]rovide a minimum of 35
percent, but not to exceed 50 percent of total FCP flood risk management
costs.”).
345. See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 57–58; cf. Thomas C. Beierle,
The Quality of Stakeholder-Based Decisions, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 739, 744 (2002)
(describing instances where stakeholder decisions are generally cost effective
and thus high-scoring under its empirical analysis; but in low-scoring cases,
“one of the principal criticisms of stakeholder processes rang true: more
expensive solutions were required to satisfy the interests of the parties
involved. One example is the Corps stakeholder process to develop a disposal
plan for waste from a water-treatment plant in Ohio’s Three Rivers
Watershed. Unresolved differences between urban residents, who would
benefit from the proposed disposal plan, and rural citizens, who would bear
the risks, led stakeholders to recommend a plan that was ‘less impressive, less
efficient, and more costly but also more politically acceptable’ than what the
Corps originally proposed”).
346. See FREITAG ET AL., supra note 301.
347. See id. at 114.
348. Id.
349. SeeMNDAKUPSTREAM COALITION, supra note 324.
350. Erik Burgess, Minnesota Questions Legality of Building Levees
Around Oxbow, Hickson, Bakke, INFORUM (Jan. 20, 2014, 9:38 PM),
http://www.inforum.com/content/minnesota-questions-legality-building-levees
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staging area came down, the Mayor of Oxbow told project
developers that his citizens “deserve the same type of
protection [that project designers] are building for Fargo.”351
Their protests are fairly straightforward. The Corps’ solution
for Fargo-Moorhead should not dump the issue on nearby
communities without protecting them too.352 The proposal is to
use a “ring levee” concept that would “be between 9 and 12 feet
high” around the O-H-B communities.353 Opinions are mixed,
but skeptics are concerned that the O-H-B levee allows “for
periodic staging of water, for an indeterminate amount of
time.”354
Financing the O-H-B levee and the project’s tentative
authorization is also hotly contested. Minnesota determined it
would issue an EIS for the Diversion project’s new design
changes.355 In a letter to project officials, state officials from
Minnesota found that the project’s construction could be
considered “prejudicial” under Minnesota’s Environmental
Policy Act:356
If . . . the O-H-B Levee is a segment of the larger Diversion Project
(e.g., a phased or connection action), the commencement of
construction prior to completion of the state final EIS and adequacy
determination would be a violation of Minnesota law. We would
appreciate understanding the Diversion Authority’s position and
reasoning on this issue. Specifically, is the O-H-B Levee a stand-
alone project or is it a part of the larger Diversion Project, and what
-around-oxbow-hickson-bakke.
351. News: Ring Levee Concept Outline for Landowners, F-M AREA
DIVERSION, http://fmdiversion.com/newsdetails.php?ID=72 (last visited Oct.
10, 2014).
352. See id.
353. Id.
354. Marcus Larson, Response to Oxbow Mayor Jim Nyhof, FMDAM.ORG
(Jan. 27, 2014), http://fmdam.org/response-to-oxbow-mayor-jim-nyhof/.
355. See Letter from Jill Townley, EIS Project Manager, Minn. Dep’t
Natural Res., to Darrell Vanyo, Chair, Fargo-Moorhead Diversion Bd. of Auth.
(Jan. 14, 2014), available at http://fmdam.org/wp-content/uploads
/2014/01/2014-01-14-MN-DNR-letter-to-Darell-Vanyo.pdf.
356. Id. (“Prejudicial actions are those that limit alternatives or mitigative
measures or predetermine subsequent development. In other words, actions
that makes one option, including the option of not building the project, more
or less likely to be chosen.”). See MINN. R. 4410.3100 (2009) (“An action
prejudices the ultimate decision on a project if it tends to determine
subsequent development or to limit alternatives or mitigative measures.”).
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is the reasoning the Diversion Authority has applied in reaching its
determination?357
Supporters of the Diversion project argue that the O-H-B
levee is independent of the Diversion project,358 thus legal
under Minnesota law, although original project designs, prior
to discovering negative hydrological impacts downstream, did
not include flood protection measures for the O-H-B
communities.359
Raising additional skepticism among critics is a specific
agreement entered into between the Diversion Authority and
the city of Oxbow to construct the ring levee project,360 which
provided that “cost of the construction of the levee will be a
Metro Flood Project cost.”361 The O-H-B levee has the
appearance of a consolation prize for the upstream
communities. Only after the Diversion project incorporated
upstream storage, which would inundate the O-H-B
communities, did project developers discuss additional
protective measures specifically for those communities.362
It is doubtful that O-H-B citizens would ever renounce the
protective measure, considering the alternatives—
uninhabitable floodplain, or to independently construct a costly
flood protection project on their own. The Diversion Authority’s
agreement with one of the O-H-B communities describes the
357. Letter from Jill Townley to Darrell Vanyo, supra note 355.
358. Burgess, supra note 350.
359. Archi Ingersoll, Mark Dayton Wants Fargo-Moorhead Flood Diversion
Work Halted, PIONEER PRESS, http://www.twincities.com/localnews/ci
_26407867/mark-dayton-wants-all-work-fargo-moorhead-flood (last updated
Aug. 26, 2014) (“Minnesota Gov. Mark Dayton is urging the federal
government to stop its work on Fargo-Moorhead’s flood diversion plan,
including any approval of funding, until Minnesota can complete an
environmental review of the $1.8 billion project.”).
360. CITY OF OXBOW, N.D & METRO FLOOD DIVERSION BD. OF AUTHORITY,
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 3 (2013), available at http://www.fm
diversion.com/pdf/FC%20Packets/2013/06-12-13_Oxbow_MOU_Item%20No.%
205.pdf.
361. Id. at 9 (“The Diversion Authority agrees that the cost of the
construction of the levee will be a Metro Flood Project cost. The Diversion
Authority intends to use a combination of funding provided sales tax revenues
of the city of Fargo and of the county of Cass and by appropriated funds of the
state of North Dakota to finance the obligations described in this
memorandum of understanding.”).
362. See id.
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benefits from the levee in a fairly circuitous way.363 The
agreement between Oxbow and the Diversion Authority states
that “sales tax revenues of the city of Fargo and the County of
Cass [which includes the O-H-B communities] will be used as
the principal source of funds to repay bonds sold to finance the
local share of the Metro Flood project costs.”364 To do so will
involve a “special improvement district” to “include all lands
that receive a benefit from the Metro Flood Project.”365 A draft
of the agreement stipulates the party’s expectations:
[P]roperty protected by the O-H-B levee will be included in said
assessment district; however, the Diversion Authority intends that
such property owners be treated as if no benefit is received from the
Metro Flood Project except to the extent that such property benefits
from an enhancement of the flood protection (or, rather, flood risk
reduction) provided by the O-H-B Levee, such as enhancement from
100-year to 500-year flood risk reduction.366
Compared to a later draft:
[P]roperty protected by the O-H-B levee will be included in said
assessment district; however, the Diversion Authority intends that
such property owners be treated as if no benefit is received from the
Metro Flood Project. In the event that any property protected by the
O-H-B levee is assessed for construction of the Metro Flood Project,
the Diversion Authority agrees to pay all such assessments.367
In perhaps a way to shield itself from the perception that
the O-H-B levee is not a component of the Diversion project, the
draft agreement above stated the project’s benefits as enhanced
“flood protection” against an infrequent, yet potentially
devastating flood (from a 100-year to 500-year flood risk
reduction).368 In reality, the levee is not protecting the
communities from a devastating flood; it is protecting them
from the storage area.369 The O-H-B levee benefits the
363. CITY OF OXBOW, N.D & METRO FLOOD DIVERSION BD. OF AUTHORITY,
DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 4 (2013), available at
http://www.oxbownd.com/uploads/MOU--City_of_Oxbow_non_red_lined.pdf
(presenting a draft version of the final Memorandum of Understanding).
364. Id.
365. Id. at 5.
366. Id. (quoting Section 2.6.1.).
367. CITY OF OXBOW, N.D & METRO FLOOD DIVERSION BD. OF AUTHORITY,
supra note 360, at 9 (quoting Section 2.8.1.).
368. CITY OF OXBOW, N.D & METRO FLOOD DIVERSION BD. OF AUTHORITY,
supra note 363, at 5.
369. See id.
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communities when the upstream staging area is engaged.370
Future flood protection is an interesting way to characterize
how the O-H-B levee benefits the communities371—considering
that the levee only benefits the communities after the
upstream storage area is activated—and that the goal of the
storage area is to protect Fargo-Moorhead and downstream
interests.372
No matter how the Counties’ litigation with the Corps is
resolved, or how the MN DNR interprets project developers’
motivation to construct the levee, tension between the
Diversion project and rural interests are likely to grow. The
Diversion Authority’s financial contribution to protect the
O-H-B communities was an exceptional outcome, considering
that other affected communities in the RRB did not also receive
the same protection.373
The Diversion project’s follies indicate that comprehensive
flood solutions are still a fractured enterprise. It is plausible
that earlier formulation of a distributed retention design could
have helped the communities decide where to displace the
water, rather than be displaced by it. Some dissenters are
likely still holding onto that possibility. In their search for
assistance, some rural community interests are relying on
other federal sources for funding, realizing that federal dollars
are not likely to come from the Diversion project.
C. FUNDING COMPREHENSIVE BASIN-WIDE RETENTION
Flood risk reduction in the RRB has come in the form of
other federal support. Currently, small watershed flood
reduction projects are funded by the Natural Resource
370. See id.
371. Burgess, supra note 350 (“A spokesman for the MnDak Upstream
Coalition stated that, ‘[t]he Diversion Authority is trying to claim, ‘Well, this
gives them 500-year flood protection.’ Well, why would they be interested in
giving Oxbow 500-year flood protection? And Comstock?’ . . . ‘It’s very
disingenuous for them to say this is a separate component.’”).
372. Letter from Jill Townley to Darrell Vanyo, supra note 355, at 2
(“According to the MOU, the O-H-B Levee is necessitated because the Oxbow
community will be ‘impacted by the periodic staging of water upstream of the
physical structure’ of the Diversion Project and the O-H-B Levee is designed to
mitigate the additional flooding within the Oxbow community associated with
the Diversion Project.”).
373. Id.
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Conservation Service (NRCS),374 an agency of the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA).375 The NRCS
combines its conservation efforts with rural flood reduction
efforts,376 to promote both flood prevention377 and watershed
protection.378 Its source of funding comes in the form of the
Farm Bill,379 but for the last decade the Farm Bill has been a
constrained source of funding for the high demand of rural
flood reduction.380
Comprehensive flood retention presents an anomalous
situation. The Corps’ framework prevents it from widening the
scope of its flood reduction efforts to include basin-wide
retention.381 On the other hand, the Farm Bill has typically
provided federal funds for basin-wide flood reduction efforts.382
The 2014 Farm Bill would include nearly $500 million toward
rural water management initiatives, which could potentially be
374. In 1935, Congress pronounced that “the wastage of soil and moisture
resources on farm, grazing, and forest lands . . . is a menace to the national
welfare.” Soil Conservation Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-46, 49 Stat. 163. This
Act established the first Soil Conservation Service, later to become the
Natural Resource Conservation Service or NRCS. Id.
375. Natural Resources Conservation Service, 7 C.F.R. § 610 (2009); State
Technical Committees, NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE,
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/technical/st
c/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
376. State Technical Committees, supra note 375.
377. See Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887.
378. See Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act of 1954, Pub. L.
No. 83-566, 68 Stat. 666.
379. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234,
122 Stat. 923.
380. See NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., MINNESOTA
ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT 10 (2012), available at https://prod.nrcs.usda.gov
/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/nrcs142p2_023094.pdf. But see Hoeven: Farm
Bill Signed into Law, U.S. SENATOR JOHN HOEVEN FOR N.D. (Feb. 7, 2014),
http://www.hoeven.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-releases?ID=beddc626-b8
f8-4b22-88f8-c1aee2a613dd (“The farm bill includes rural water management
and flood protection. It includes $500 million for the Regional Conservation
Partnership Program (RCPP) that can be used in part to support flood
protection in the Red River Valley, as well as other conservation, rural
development and energy programs.”).
381. See, e.g., CARTER & STERN, supra note 31, at 5 (initiating a Corps
Project may require congressional action).
382. See Hoeven: Farm Bill Signed into Law, supra note 380. Congress has
recently reauthorized the Farm Bill, giving more hope to comprehensive flood
protection in the RRB. See id.
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used “in part” to create RRB retention projects.383 Before the
Farm Bill’s passage the RRBC noted in its 2013 Annual Report
that the RRRA would work to secure funds through the NRCS,
but the RRBC identified a need for $1.5 billion to achieve its
Long Term Flood Solutions Goal.384 This means rural flood
fighters with few funding options in lieu of the Farm Bill will
have to work vigorously to find additional funding. But with
minimal federal funding available, it is a substantial hardship
for small rural communities to raise the funds necessary to
implement local flood retention projects of their own.385 So
considering that federal funding for rural retention projects is
lacking, and that the planning limitations of Corps-backed
projects excludes comprehensive flood reduction, rural flood
communities seem to be at an impasse.
Since the final decision on the Diversion project was made,
the Corps has made efforts to collaborate with various RRB
stakeholders to address flood-related issues.386 These include
ongoing studies that look at flood storage in the RRB,387 with
the Corps serving more or less in an advisory role.388
Particularly, joint powers organizations in the RRB are
working with the Corps to develop water storage projects.389
The RRRA, the Corps, and the NRCS have entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding to promote “early coordination
383. See Hoeven Working to Advance Permanent Flood Protection for Red
River Valley, U.S. SENATOR JOHN HOEVEN FOR N.D. (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://www.hoeven.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-releases?ContentRecord
_id=b2e6bb79-a38f-400b-ab3e-2ee76d59c537.
384. See RED RIVER BASIN COMM’N, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2013),
available at http://www.redriverbasincommission.org/Annual_Report
_2013.pdf.
385. See Grafton, N.D., Seeks Cheaper Flood Protection, JAMESTOWN SUN
(Oct. 22, 2013, 8:03 AM), http://www.jamestownsun.com/content/grafton-nd
-seeks-cheaper-flood-protection-federal-funds-uncertain-city-opts-scaled-back.
386. See WILLIAMS & BROWN, supra note 75, at 1; see also NEW
DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 7 (suggesting that the Corps should make
informed adjustments to the final project to reflect changes in environmental
and social conditions).
387. See FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT APPENDIX, supra note 271, at U-4
(noting the Red River Basin-wide Watershed Study and the Fargo-Moorhead
and Upstream Area feasibility study).
388. See Board Meeting, RED RIVERWATERSHEDMGMT. BOARD 3 (Sept. 18,
2012), http://www.rrwmb.org/userfiles/file/Sep2012%20min.pdf.
389. See id.
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and participation . . . on proposed non-federal and federal flood
water retention structures and projects” so that the RRRA
could “significantly streamline the [Corps’] permitting
process.”390 However, even under the Corps’ facilitation, project
studies have been constrained by other funding priorities.391
The Corps and RRB stakeholders are told to rely on prior
reconnaissance studies for collecting information on present
retention strategies,392 with the possibility of “[a]dditional
study efforts [being] considered as stakeholders express
interest in them and as funding allows.”393
It is likely that federal funding of comprehensive flood
solutions will continue to be an issue for rural RRB
stakeholders. Hopeful for the future, RRRA chairmen say that
Farm Bill funding, “leveraged with state, regional, and local
monies, certainly will accelerate the ability to move forward
with projects now and in the near future.”394 But even among
the vast array of flood fighting strategies, RRB citizens are
fixated on a Diversion project, even though, presently, the
RRBC is “linking” with the Diversion Authority on retention
projects that might specifically benefit the LPP.395 The
Diversion Authority’s collaboration with the RRBC for
additional retention projects makes the Corps’ omission of
basin-wide retention, as part of the greater Diversion project,
even harder to swallow.
390. Id. at 3.
391. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ST. PAUL DIST., RED RIVER OF
THE NORTH BASIN: RECONNAISSANCE STUDY, MINNESOTA/NORTH
DAKOTA/SOUTH DAKOTA 63 (2014), available at http://www.mvp.usace
.army.mil/Portals/57/docs/Civil%20Works/Information%20Papers/March%202
014/dSA%20RRN%20Basin%20Recon-3-14.pdf (“Due to other funding
priorities, no reconnaissance studies are underway at this time.”).
392. Id. (“Reconnaissance studies are 100 percent federally-funded and are
limited in cost to $100,000 each. Therefore, they must make use of available,
existing information.”).
393. Id.
394. John Finney & Gary Thompson, LETTER: Retention’s Role in Flood
Protection Grows, GRAND FORKS HERALD (Mar. 15, 2014, 4:30 AM),
http://www.grandforksherald.com/content/letter-retentions-role-flood-protectio
n-grows.
395. RED RIVER BASIN COMM’N, supra note 384, at 14.
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VII. CENTRALIZING THE CORPS’ ACTIVITY IN COMPLEX
RIVER BASIN SYSTEMS
In a 2003 article, Professor Daniel P. Loucks posed the
question, “[h]ow can the federal government provide expertise,
vision and leadership, where needed, without violating states
rights and without diminishing the planning and management
initiatives that river basin commissions, local non-
governmental organizations and citizen groups, may have
assumed?”396 Unfortunately, interstate river basin
management has many moving parts, so the answer will likely
depend on the situation. Loucks answered his question with
many alternatives, but his summary of federal participation is
illustrative:
[I]f mistakes are to be avoided by not taking into account the suite of
needs and objectives of the entire basin when making local decisions,
some entity needs to be responsible for providing this integrated
perspective. Clearly federal leadership and coordination are needed
for integrated planning and management of multi-state river basins.
Even if the management of water in multi-state river basins is
overseen by river basin commissions, such commissions cannot
function adequately without federal participation and the authority
to coordinate the multitude of federal, state and local agencies
typically involved in water management. The alternative is
management by lawsuits . . . .397
For the RRB, the Corps might find itself better suited to
serve the RRB in an advisory capacity, serving local
communities via small stakeholder groups. North Dakota and
Minnesota utilize an “equivalent entity” known as the Red
River Joint Water Resource District (RRJWRD), and the Red
River Basin Flood Damage Reduction Work Group,
respectively.398 These groups are focused on individual flood
reduction projects throughout their jurisdiction, mainly
concerning rural project stakeholders.399 These groups have
396. Loucks, supra note 5, at 22.
397. Id. at 27.
398. Board Meeting, supra note 388, at 3.
399. See RED RIVER JOINT WATER RES. DIST., 2007–2009 WATER
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 3 (n.d.), available at http://www.redriverjointwrd.org
/uploads/4/0/1/1/4011927/rrjwrdstrategy.pdf (defining its strategy as
“[p]rovid[ing] an inventory of specific actions (projects, programs, and studies)
that will help the RRJWD meet its water management and development
goals.”). See generally RED RIVER WATERSHED MGMT. BD., PROJECT CATALOG:
MINNESOTA RED RIVER BASIN FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION PROJECTS (2008),
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survived under the philosophy that consolidating substate
watershed efforts helps to strengthen comprehensive water
management.400 With this in mind, the Corps’ could act as a
“service provider to local, state, and federal agencies,”401
depending on the geographical scope of the project.
Undoubtedly, the Corps will have to continue giving local
project sponsors flexibility to choose projects that are “worth
the costs” to them,402 but the Corps should also keep in mind
what those costs mean to non-project stakeholders. If the Corps
facilitated discussion between various stakeholders and
government entities, such as the RRWMB and the RRJWRD,
and provided technical expertise that would complement (if not
advise) the groups’ work,403 a project’s value could be “relative
to each project”—instead of a sole reliance on NED.404
Currently, the Corps is taking an approach that tends to
balance its national objective and the objectives of project
stakeholders.405 The process in which the Corps selected the
LPP is a good example (although perhaps too heavy on the
project stakeholder side). On one hand, leaving too many
projects to too many substate entities, for instance watershed
districts, might create “cumulative environmental effects”406
that require federal usurpation. This situation ultimately led to
the 1998 Mediation agreement between the MN DNR, the
Corps, and RRWMB after the DNR initiated a joint-EIS with
the Corps.407 On the other hand, taking too much control of
projects might hinder the “shared vision” observed by many
collaborative basin groups.408
Professor Loucks advises that a federal agency that cannot
“coordinate the multitude of federal, state and local agencies
available at http://www.rrwmb.org/files/ ProjectCatalog2008.pdf (listing
several projects in rural areas).
400. About the RRJWRD, RED RIVER JOINT WATER RES. DIST.,
http://www.redriverjointwrd.org/about-the-rrjwrd.html (last visited Oct. 24,
2014).
401. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 70.
402. Id.
403. See id.
404. Id.
405. See id.
406. MEDIATIONAGREEMENT, supra note 85, at 2.
407. Id. at 2–3.
408. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 17, at 70.
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typically involved in water management” will discover how a
“lawsuit by any single stakeholder interest group can stop an
entire basin-wide effort.”409 The upstream litigation is an
impeccable example of Loucks’s point, and should be heeded by
the Corps.
Can individual projects administered by watershed
districts eventually lead to comprehensive water retention? The
answer is “it depends.” Watershed districts are at the ground
level and work very closely with managing local water
resources. However, comprehensive flood protection will likely
lose its efficiency unless there is truly coordination. That is,
there must be a legitimate vision that “managing the whole is
better than managing or correcting the sum of its parts.”410
While Corps’ engineers continue designing the Diversion
project, the Corps may decide that incorporating retention
strategies might advance broader RRB policy objectives:
comprehensive retention, a diversion, increased stakeholder
participation, and a one-shot opportunity for basin-wide
funding.411 But until interstate watershed management is
standardized, this idea might be impractical.412 It is likely that
comprehensive retention projects will be left to groups like the
RRRA and its equivalents, and the Corps as the RRB’s federal
shepherd.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Perhaps if the Corps had adjusted the way it participated
in RRB flood protection early on, by assisting watershed
districts in planning for the Diversion project, in addition to a
diversion design, a comprehensive water retention system
could have been constructed. The project scope might have
encompassed a larger geographic area, potentially reducing
community losses associated with the upstream staging area.
Furthermore, early project coordination with various RRB
water institutions might have brought about basin-wide flood
retention planning, with derivative benefits to the communities
409. Loucks, supra note 5, at 27.
410. DEBARRY, supra note 20, at 4.
411. See id.
412. See Goldfarb, supra note 90, at 494.
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protected by the Diversion project. At any rate, RRB citizens
can only look ahead.
The main issue with floodwater is that no one wants it to
be their problem. But at the same time, it has to be put
somewhere. An argument can be made for the farmer who
drains water onto the property of another not using his land for
agriculture, so that the farmer may begin planting his crop
sooner. However, adjacent farmers with this line of reasoning
create a labyrinth of water management problems. The
Diversion project’s development experienced similar woes.
When the Corps changed the original project design so that it
would reduce downstream impacts, it was decided the loss
would fall on upstream communities. If there is one thing to be
learned from the RRB case study, it is that near-sighted flood
planning rarely pays off. The Diversion project will be viewed
as a monumental structure in the history of the RRB,
protecting Fargo-Moorhead citizens and surrounding
communities for many years to come. But will it also be
remembered as a missed opportunity for comprehensive flood
planning? The efforts of the RRRA and various substate
watershed institutions will be a deciding factor.
